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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1998, the European Union opened negotiations with six Central and
Eastern European countries seeking membership. These countries consisted
of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus.
Some current members are apprehensive, believing that they will lose from
this expansion. This report scrutinizes the grounds for such anxiety. It evalu-
ates the size and the structure of future East-West migration flows based on
economic theories and empirical results forthcoming from economic litera-
ture. A broader analysis of the East-West migration potential is given in the
complementary report by the University College, London. The current report
also analyses concerns that cheaper workers from Central and Eastern
European EU-candidate countries will flood the current EU and reduce the
wages of native workers and/or push them out of their jobs.
It is very difficult to estimate the potential migration flow from East to
West. Studies attempting to estimate the size of the migration potential have
arrived at very different conclusions. Newspapers and politicians have spe-
culated that about 20-40 million East Europeans will emigrate. Estimations
based on opinion polls in the sending countries suggest that between 13 and
27 million people are planning to move to the West, whereas more modest
predictions expect about 5 million people to migrate to Western Europe.
Using different evaluation methods, this report concludes that at least 3% of
the eastern population can be expected to migrate to the West within the next
15 years. This would imply an immigration flow of about 3 million people or
of about 0.81% of the population of the EU in 1995. Existing surveys in the
potential sending countries indicate that the short-term migration potential
might be higher. Due to existing migration networks, this inflow will largely
be a problem for Germany and Austria. 
Basically, economic theory does not offer any definitive predictions con-
cerning the labour market impacts of immigration. Whether the native popu-
lation can expect gains or losses from immigration depends, among other
things, on the size and the structure of the immigration flow and the labour
market institutions in the receiving countries (i.e. wage flexibility). Most
existing empirical studies on the impact of immigrants on the wage and
employment of natives find only small negative effects. In some cases the
effects are even positive. 
Based on data for the EU, the UK, and Germany, simulating an econo-
mic model of the labour market effects of immigration shows that, in the
worst case scenario, immigration of 1% of the EU-population in one year
would imply income losses for the EU member countries of about 34.461 bil-
lion ECU or about 0.7% of the EU GDP in 1993. For the UK, the equivalentII
figure is 2.027 billion ECU (or 0.26% of the UK GDP in 1996) and for
Germany, the maximum simulated loss is 8.975 billion ECU (0.65% of the
German GDP in 1996). These losses would appear in a scenario of rigid
wages and the immigration of exclusively unskilled workers. In the case
where mainly skilled workers immigrate, one could actually expect gains
from immigration. A 1% increase in the EU labour force in one year, due to
the immigration of skilled workers, could be expected to increase the income
of natives by about 367.092 billion ECU or about 6.9% of EU GDP in 1993.
A similar increase in the UK and German labour force, could be expected to
increase the income of natives by about 4.205 billion ECU (0.53% of UK
GDP) in the UK and by 19.192 billion ECU (1.38% of the German GDP) in
Germany. Simulations, however, also show that immigration always has
large effects on the income distribution in the receiving country. 
Only in the long-run does the EU have several options regarding migra-
tion policy towards the potential members. Considering Article 8a of the
Single European Act, a laissez-faire system of unrestricted labour mobility
between the old and the new member countries seems to be unavoidable.
However, as in the case when Spain and Portugal became EU-members, a
temporary restriction of migration from the countries seeking EU members-
hip might be a realistic option. In this case, a selection of migrants with hig-
her skills may be beneficial. If unskilled and skilled workers are comple-
ments in production, substantial gains may also be reached through the
improvement of the employment possibilities of unskilled native workers.
These points suggest that a temporary, selective immigration policy towards
the new member countries should be seriously considered. There are several
possibilities for the form of such a selective immigration policy. Adiscussion
of these options reveals that a point system, such as that used in Canada or
Australia, is impractical. From an economic point of view, an auction system,
in which temporary immigration visas are auctioned to native firms, is super-
ior to all other policy options. An alternative, and from a political standpoint,
the most feasible strategy would be a selective temporary immigration poli-
cy based on bilateral agreements as executed currently by the German
government.III
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998 the European Union opened negotiations with six Central and
Eastern European countries seeking membership. Based on the capacity of
these countries to bring their economic, political, and legal systems into line
with EU norms, the European Union divided the candidates for EU
membership into two groups. The first group consists of the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus. With this group of countries
the EU began preparatory talks in March 1998. The second group consists of
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. These countries must
bring their economies closer to EU standards, before opening talks with them
would be worthwhile for the EU. In principle, all EU members favour the
idea of extending the EU. However, some current members fear that they will
lose from this expansion. More specifically:
•  countries like Ireland and Spain are concerned that they will lose regional
aid from the EU;
•  France is worried about loosing subsidies for the agricultural sector; 
•  and finally there are fears of potentially large-scale immigration of job
seekers from entering countries into the current EU-member countries. In
particular, countries with direct borders to the potential new EU members,
such as Austria and Germany, have expressed this latter fear.
This report analyses the fear that cheaper, unemployed worker from
Central and Eastern European EU-candidate countries will flood the current
EU, reducing the wages of native workers or pushing them out of their jobs.
It is evident that EU wages are higher than in the applicant countries.
Unemployment in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary, however, is
lower than the EU average. Similar fears were voiced when Greece, Spain,
and Portugal applied for EU membership. Yet, despite the economic
differences between these countries and the richer North, the expected mass
migration did not occur. It is therefore not clear per se whether the current
EU members have to fear mass migration from the East to the West, when
the Eastern European candidates become EU members.
In Section 2 of this report, we describe the size and structure of past and
current migration flows from Central and Eastern European countries to the
current EU members, in order to give a first indication of the migration
problem. We then give an overview of the theoretical literature and the
empirical evidence on the economic and social determinants of migration. An
understanding of the determinants of international migration is the first
important step for the assessment of possible migration pressures from the
East to the West. In section 2.3 we evaluate the size and structure of future
East-West migration based on four different methods. First, we use estimates2
of the size of East-West migration following the opening up of Central and
Eastern European countries in the beginning of the 1990s. Second, we
qualitatively evaluate the future East-West migration pressure, based on the
economic and demographic situation in Eastern and Western Europe. Third,
we use a survey of the applicant countries to evaluate future migration flows.
Finally, we use econometric methods in order to study the determinants of
internal migration in the current EU. The results of this econometric analysis
are then used to predict future East-West migration.
Section 3 analyses the labour market effects of East-West migration. In
the first part, we review the theoretical framework used in economics to
analyse the labour market effects of immigration. This review considers not
only the standard economic model, which assumes full employment, but also
economic models, which take into account the possibility of labour market
rigidities, i.e. the possibility of unemployment. The latter model is more
suitable for European labour markets. The second part gives a detailed
survey of the existing empirical evidence concerning the effects of
immigration on wages and employment of natives. In the final part, we use
the theoretical models outlined in Section 3.1., data from the EU and the size
of the expected migration flow from the applicant countries (evaluated in
Section 3.2), in order to simulate the likely labour market effects of the
immigration of workers to current EU member countries.
In Section 4 of this report, we discuss the policy implications of our
analysis. We first argue that there is a need for a common EU immigration
policy and then discuss alternative options for such a policy. In the second
part, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different migration
policies, i.e. a scenario of immediately free labour mobility and a scenario in
which the labour mobility between the membership candidates and the
current EU member countries is restricted for an adjustment period, as was
the case when Spain and Portugal joined the EU. The discussion also
considers different strategies for a temporary, selective immigration policy
towards the potential EU entrants. Section 5 of this report concludes and
gives a short outline of additional problems to be addressed in future
research.3
2.  EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL MIGRATION FLOWS
FROM CENTRALAND EASTERN EUROPE TO THE 
EU
2.1. The size and structure of current migration flows from Central 
and Eastern Europe to the EU
2.1.1. Current Migration to the EU
In this section we discuss the migration experience of EU member countries.
We focus not only on immigration from Eastern and Central European
countries but also on the internal migration experience of the 15 EU
countries. We use experience with internal migration within the EU to infer
potential future immigration flows from Eastern European countries
following a potential enlargement. Table 1 shows the stock of foreign
population living in the EU member states in 1993. In total, approximately
17 million foreigners live in the respective EU countries, of which about 4.9
million people or 1.3% of the total EU population come from within the EU
and about 12 million people or 3.3% of the total EU population come from
outside the EU. The main receiving countries for both foreigners from the
EU and migrants from outside the EU, are Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom.  Approximately 4.0 million foreigners from outside the EU
originate from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, 2.9 million from Africa, 1
million from America, 1.9 million from Asia, and 1.1 million from Central
and Eastern Europe. The main receiving country for people from the EU is
Germany, followed by France and the United Kingdom. People from areas
outside the European Union predominantly go to Germany. Even Asia has a
larger immigrant population in Germany than in the United Kingdom.1
Among the major European immigration countries, Germany attracts mostly
Turks, people from the former Yugoslavia, and migrants from Central and
Eastern European countries. France receives Africans, while the United
Kingdom mainly attracts migrants from EU member states and Asia. Figure
1 shows that Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium have the highest shares of
foreigners, followed by France, Austria, and Sweden.
1 Many Asians, however, carry UK passports.4
According to Table 1, approximately 67% of all immigrants from Central
and Eastern Europe reside in Germany, followed by Austria, Italy, France, the
United Kingdom, and Greece. Roughly 41.2% of all Central and Eastern
European migrants come from Poland, 20.7% from Romania, 8.4% from the
former Czech and Slovakian Federal Republic (CSFR) and Hungary, and
7.5% from Bulgaria. Figure 2 shows the share of migrants from Central and
Eastern European countries in relation to the total population in each of the
respective EU countries. According to this figure, Germany and Austria have
the largest shares of foreigners from Eastern Europe followed by Sweden,
Finland, and Switzerland. 
Figure 1: 
Share of foreign population in Western European Countries, 1993
(in % of total population)
Source: Eurostat (1995), own calculations.
The numbers in Table 1, however, do not include Aussiedler, immigrants of
German origin from East Europe. Ethnic Germans automatically receive
German citizenship and, therefore, disappear from the official statistics on
immigrants.2 As a consequence of the collapse of the socialist regime, the
inflow of Aussiedler in West Germany jumped from 78,523 in 1987 to
> 8.0%                      (3)
from 4.0% to 8.0%   (4)
from 2.0% to 4.0%   (4)
from 1.0% to 2.0%   (5)
< 1.0%                      (1)
2 An extensive discussion of the migration of ethnic Germans is given by Schmidt (1994), and Bauer
et. al. (1999).202,673 in 1988, 377,055 in 1989, and 397,073 in 1990. Consequently, the
German government altered the entry procedures for Aussiedler in 1990,
requiring them to apply for entry before arrival. In the meantime, Germany
has also introduced an immigration quota for a maximum of 220,000 ethnic
Germans per year and now requires the passing of a German language test in
order for an immigrant to be eligible for Aussiedler status. These measures
led to a reduced immigration flow: between 1991 and 1995 Aussiedler
immigration was about 220,000 per year, falling to 177,751 in 1996 and
134,419 in 1997. In total, between 1950 and 1997, 3.8 million ethnic
Germans migrated to West Germany. From 1988 to 1997, 65.4% of the
Aussiedler came from the former USSR, 24.7% from Poland, and 9.2% from
Romania. At the end of 1997, 98% of the ethnic Germans came from the
former USSR, while the shares of ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania
decreased to 0.5% and 1.3%, respectively. In total, between 1950 and 1993,
3.068 million Aussiedler migrated to West Germany. Adding this number to
those reported in Table 1, it appears that about 91% of all Central and East
European migrants in the EU live in Germany.
Figure 2: 
Share of foreign population from Central and Eastern European
Countries in Western European Countries, 1993 (in % of total
population)
Source: Eurostat (1995), own calculations.
5
> 8.0%                      (2)
from 3.0% to 0,8%   (3)
from 0,2% to 0,3%   (1)
from 0,1% to 0,2%   (5)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.1.2. Temporary Migration From East and Central Europe: The Case of
Germany
Even though most EU member states have tightened their restrictions on
permanent immigration, the demand for temporary workers is growing.
Given the purpose of this report, we will not give a detailed description of
the different legislations in current EU member states regarding temporary
migration. A detailed discussion of the characteristics of and the legislation
on temporary migration in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States is
given by OECD (1998). Rather, we concentrate our discussion on the
bilateral agreements for temporary migration, which Germany has signed
with several Central and East European countries (CEEC), and the
immigration from these countries to Germany, which has occurred under
these agreements.
The following goals were at the core of the bilateral agreements between
Germany and the CEEC-countries concerning temporary migration:
• to bring the CEEC-countries up to Western European standards;
•  solidarity with CEEC-countries;
•  to impart skills to firms and workers with modern technology in 
order to foster economic development in the countries of origin;
•  to decrease the immigration pressure from these countries;
•  and to promote economic co-operation with these countries. 
Following these goals Germany created three different categories under
which workers from CEEC-countries could temporarily work in Germany.
Table 2 describes the basic legislative characteristics of these categories. 
Germany has signed bilateral agreements with several Central and
Eastern European countries regarding the immigration of Werkvertrags-
arbeitnehmer. According to these bilateral agreements, Eastern European
firms are allowed to employ their own workers in project-linked work
arrangements co-ordinated under contracts with German firms. The workers
immigrating under this category are allowed to stay until the project is
finished but not longer than 3 years. After a worker has stayed in Germany
as a Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer, he must stay in his country of origin at least
as long as he has been in Germany in order to return to Germany again. The
wage of the Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer must be the same as that of similar
German workers.  However, since the social security contributions of these
workers are paid by their firm from the country of origin according to the
rules of this country, the wage costs of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer are lower
than those of comparable Germans. The number of workers who can work
under these treaties is limited by quotas, which are adapted each year
according to the labour market situation in Germany. If the number ofWerkvertragsarbeitnehmer from a particular country exceeds the respective
quota, Germany does not allow the immigration of additional workers, and
the quota will be blocked the following year. Furthermore, work permits are
not granted in districts in which unemployment is significantly higher than
the national average. 
Figure 3: Workers employed in Germany under a contract for services,
1988-1996
Source: Lederer (1997), own calculations.
Figure 3 shows the development of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer employ-ment
in Germany since 1988.  It appears that the employment of Werk-
vertragsarbeitnehmer increased sharply from 14,500 in 1988 to 95,000 in
1992. After 1992, the number of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer decreased to
about 46,000 in 1996. This decrease is mainly a result of the steady cut backs
of the quotas. Figure 3 also reveals that in most years Polish
Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer constituted almost 50% of all workers employed
in Germany under these bilateral agreements, followed by workers from
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Characteristics of bilateral agreements between Germany and
CEEC countries concerning temporary immigrationIn addition to the Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer, Germany initiated guest
worker programs with several CEECs. These are also regulated under
bilateral agreements. The aim of this program is to improve the professional
and linguistic skills of the participants. The participants have to meet the
following requirements: (i) completion of vocational training, (ii) basic
knowledge of the German language, and (iii) fall eighteen and forty years
old. These guest workers can stay in Germany for a maximum of 18 months.
They need a work permit, even though the programs are not dependent on
the labour situation in Germany. They must be paid the same wage as a
similar German worker and, in contrast to the Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer,
their social security requirements follow the German standards. Figure 4
shows the development of migrants employed in Germany under the guest
worker programs.  From 1991 to 1993 the number of guest workers
increased from 1,570 to 5,771 and slightly decreased thereafter to 4,341 in
1996. Most of the guest workers come from Hungary and the Czech
Republic, followed by guest workers from Poland and Slovakia.
Figure 4: Guest workers employed in Germany, 1991-1996
Source: Lederer (1997), own calculations.
Since 1991 foreign workers are able to obtain a German work permit for
a maximum of 3 months. The requirement to get such a seasonal working
permit is again a bilateral agreement between Germany and the country of a
worker. Foreign seasonal workers are only allowed to work in agriculture,
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wage and working conditions as German workers and their employment
requires the payment of social security contributions according to German
standards. In addition, the employer has to provide seasonal workers with
accommodations. In general, there is no quota on this type of employment.
However, the German labour office has to check whether similarly
unemployed native workers are available. Figure 5 shows the development
of the employment of seasonal workers since 1991. Figure 5 shows that since
1992 the employment of seasonal workers has been between 130,000 and
220,000 per year. The decrease in seasonal workers in 1993 and 1994 can be
explained by the introduction of an employment prohibition in 1993 of
seasonal workers in the construction sector. Despite the poor employment
situation within the German labour market, the employment of seasonal
workers reached its peak in 1996 with about 221,000 workers. Most of the
seasonal workers come from Poland; in 1996, for example, they constituted
almost 90% of all seasonal workers.
Figure 5: Seasonal workers employed in Germany, 1991-1996
Source: Lederer (1997), own calculations.
Based on a representative survey of 500 Polish migrants working in
Germany, Table 3 explores the motivations behind the demand for work in
Germany as well as some socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants.3
According to Table 3, the motivations to work temporarily in Germany are
similar among the three categories of migrants analysed. The main reasons
given are that they did not earn enough money in Poland and that they























Poland           Yugoslavia/Croatia/Slovakia           Czech Republic/Slovenia           Bulgaria/Rumania           Hungary
1991                            1992                            1993                           1994                            1995                           1996
Year
3 See Mehrländer (1997) for a detailed description of this survey.12
seasonal workers had been unemployed in Poland. Based on the
requirements of the bilateral agreements, most of the Werkvertrags-
arbeitnehmer and  guest workers work in construction, followed by manu-
facturing. More than 89% of the seasonal workers are employed in
agriculture. There are remarkable differences in the occupational status of the
three categories. The majority of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer and guest
workers are skilled blue collar workers, whereas more than 90% of the
seasonal workers are employed as unskilled blue collar workers. Finally,
most of the temporary migrants work relatively long hours: 43% work 50 or
more hours per week. 
Table 3: 
Socie-economic characteristics of temporary Polish migrants in
Germany (1995)
Werkvertrags- Guest                    Seasonal 
arbeitnehmer Worker Worker
Motivations to work in Germany:
Was unemployed  22.6 23.9 37.4
Did not earn enough 56.7 48.6 43.1
Economic situation in Poland 23.1 26.6 23.7
Improvement of Family Income 40.9 30.3 41.7
Industry:
Agriculture 1.0 9.2 89.1
Manufacturing 25.0 26.6 2.8
Construction 63.0 50.5 -
Service (including Hotels and Restaurants) 9.7 11.0 8.1
Other 1.3 2.7 0.0
Occupational Status
Unskilled Blue Collar Worker 17.8 16.5 90.1
Skilled Blue Collar Worker 76.9 72.4 8.1
Unskilled White Collar Worker 2.4 1.8 0.5
Skilled White Collar Worker 2.9 9.2 0.5
Average Weekly Working Time
20 – 39 hours 12.5 34.9 13.3
40 – 49 hours 44.3 55.1 65.9
50 –59 hours 23.1 7.3 13.2
60 or more hours 19.7 2.8 5.7
Observations 208 109 211
Source: Mehrländer (1997); own calculations.13
2.2.  Reasons to migrate: A survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature
This section reviews economic theories of labour migration as well as the
existing empirical evidence on the determinants of labour migration.4 We
consider internal as well as international migration theories. In general, the
main difference between these two approaches is the legal restrictions of
international migration. Since there are no legal restrictions on labour
migration within the EU5 , migration flows between EU member countries
can be interpreted as internal migration. In section 2.3. of this report, we
use this approach for the evaluation of the potential future migration flows
from the East European countries into the EU. 
2.2.1. The theory of migration
(a) The Neoclassical approach
The neoclassical approach to migration analysis can be traced back to
Smith (1776) and Ravenstein (1889). The basic assumption of this model
is that individuals maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint. The
central argument evolves around wages. Migration mainly occurs because
of geographical differences in the demand and supply of labour markets.
Regions with a shortage of labour relative to capital are characterised by a
high equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply of labour
relative to capital are faced with low equilibrium wages. This wage
differential causes a migration flow from low wage to high wage regions.
In response to this migration flow, the supply of labour in the high wage
region increases; subsequently, the wage in this region falls. Similarly, due
to migration, the supply of labour in the low wage region decreases and the
wages in this region rise. The migration flow ends as soon as the wage
differential between the two regions reflects the costs of movement from
the low wage to the high wage region. As a result, the model argues, labour
migration emerges from actual wage differentials between regions, i.e. the
larger the wage differential the larger the migration flow. 
4 Recent surveys are given by Stark (1991), Greenwood (1985), Massey et. al. (1993), Molho
(1986), Shields and Shields (1989), Straubhaar (1988), Bauer and Zimmermann (1998).
5 An overview of the immigration policies in Europe is given by Straubhaar and Zimmermann
(1993) and Zimmermann (1994, 1995a).This early approach was extended in various ways. In order to explain
rural-urban migration in less developed countries, Todaro (1968, 1969) and
Harris and Todaro (1970) dropped the neoclassical assumption of full
employment in the sending and the receiving region and included
consideration of the probability of employment in the destination region by
migrants.6 With this extension it is possible to explain the observed large
migration flows from rural to urban regions, although the urban regions are
often characterised by a scarcity of jobs. The prospect of finding a high-
paying job in urban regions causes labour migration out of rural areas, even
though this migration could lead to unemployment. Contrary to the pure
neoclassical theory, migration, in this extended model, is determined by
expected rather than actual earnings differentials. The key variable for
migration is earnings weighted by the probability of finding employment in
the destination region. Several modifications of the basic Harris-Todaro-
model have been developed to make it more realistic.7 However, these
modifications do not change the basic findings of the original model. 
Of particular importance for the evaluation of future migration flows
between CEEC countries and the current member countries of the EU after
the planned enlargement is the effect of free trade on migration flows.
According to the standard neoclassical trade model, increasing trade is a
substitute for international migration.8 According to this model, the removal
of trade barriers leads to a specialisation in the production of goods, for
which a country has relatively abundant supply of input factors and thus a
comparative cost advantage. Assume two countries, a developed country
with many skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, and a developing
country with many unskilled workers relative to skilled workers. Assume
further that there are two goods, one that is produced by skilled workers and
one that is produced by unskilled workers. Producers in both countries have
the same technology. In this setting, trade is determined by the factor
endowments of the two countries: the developed (developing) country will
6 A review of this framework and its empirical evidence is given by Todaro (1980).
7 Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) introduce wage and production subsidy programs. Cordon and
Findlay (1975) consider capital mobility between the rural and urban regions; Fields (1975) uses
quantity instead of wage adjustments in the urban labor market; Stiglitz (1974) studies endogenous
wage determination, and Calvo (1978) introduces trade unions in the urban labor market. Schmitz ,
Stilz and Zimmermann (1994) investigate more closely how the process of wage and employment
determination is influenced by a labor union in the receiving country.
8 See OECD (1996) for a theoretical and empirical discussion of the effects of trade on interna-
tional migration.
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import the good  produced by unskilled (skilled) workers, and specialise in
the production of the good produced by skilled (unskilled) workers. Trade
between these two countries will decrease the wages of unskilled workers in
the developed country and increase the wages of skilled workers, and vice
versa in the developing country. In the long-run, the factor prices for skilled
and unskilled workers across the two countries are equalised. In general, the
basic trade model states that trade or the mobility of production factors
between countries will result in equalised factor prices, i.e. equalised wages
and interest rates in the countries involved in free trade. If factor prices are
equalised, however, the incentive to migrate disappears. Therefore, trade can
be seen as a substitute for international migration. 
(b) Human Capital Theory
Sjaastad (1962) introduced the human capital model to migration research.
This model, which probably became the most influential and widely used
approach, treats migration as an investment decision of an individual.9
Depending on their skill levels, individuals calculate the present discounted
value of expected returns of their human capital in every region, including
the home location. Migration occurs, if the returns, net of the discounted
costs of movement, are larger in a potential destination region than the
returns in the country of origin. The costs of movement not only include
money costs like travel expenses, differences in the costs of living, and
foregone earnings while moving, but also psychological costs arising, for
example, from the separation from family and friends. It should be noted that
every individual evaluates the returns and costs in a different way, depending
on personal characteristics such as age, gender, and schooling. For example:
• According to the human capital model, the likelihood of migration
decreases with age, reflecting the smaller expected lifetime gain from
moving for older people. 
•  Individuals with higher education should exhibit a higher migration pro-
bability, because an individual's greater ability to collect and process infor-
mation gained through higher education, reduces the risks of migration.
•  The risks and costs of movements are expected to rise with distance,
because information about labour market conditions will be better for closer
locations.
9 In two recent papers, Burda (1995) and Bauer (1995) extend the human capital model of
migration by introducing uncertainty about the wage differential between sending and receiving
countries and the costs of migration, respectively. They conclude that with uncertainty about the
real gains of migration, it may be rational for an individual to delay migration and to wait for new
information even in a situation where the expected migration income gain is greater than the costs
of moving. Therefore, these models could give a theoretical explanation of the coexistence of large
income differentials and low migration flows.The human capital model is not only helpful in modelling permanent
migration but also in dealing with temporary migration, which is very
important for countries with a guestworker system like Germany or
Switzerland. There are several explanations for temporary migration.10
Subsequent migration could be the result of:
•  decreasing costs due to information obtained from the first move.
•  a higher preference for consumption in the country of origin if compared
to consumption in the receiving country (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988;
Dustmann, 1994) 
• an unsuccessful prior move (Grant and Vanderkamp, 1985). 
A further cause of large, subsequent migration could be that the economic
conditions of other locations improve. In general, it is expected that an
increase in immigration causes a decline in wages of the receiving country.
In the case of rigid wages due to union behaviour or minimum wages,
immigration could also lead to increased unemployment in the destination
country. Both declining wages and increasing unemployment in the receiving
country might, therefore, make it beneficial for individuals to move on to
another region or to return home. Rising wage and employment possibilities
in the sending country, due to the emigration of labour, may also improve the
incentives for return migration.
In essence, the main contribution of the human capital approach is that
one should not only pay attention to aggregate labour market variables like
wage and unemployment differences but should also consider the importance
of the heterogeneity of individuals. Empirical studies should take into
consideration the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants. In contrast to
the standard neoclassical framework, individuals within the same country
can display very different propensities to migrate, because the rate of
remuneration on specific human capital characteristics is different in the
destination and receiving country. The human capital approach concludes
that the probability of obtaining a job in the destination country depends on
the skill level of the migrants and their incentives to invest in destination-
specific human-capital. 
(c) Asymmetric Information about Worker Skills
So far, we have only considered models with a symmetric information
pattern. In other words, it is assumed that employers in the destination region
have all relevant information regarding the abilities of immigrants. With
asymmetric information, however, the theoretical propositions may change
substantially (Stark, 1991). A possible asymmetric information pattern
16
10 See Dustmann (1996) for an overview. 17
occurs when migrants have full information concerning their abilities, but
employers within the destination region cannot observe the immigrants' true
skill levels. In this case it is efficient for the employers to offer all immigrants
a wage reflecting the productivity of the average immigrant. If the
assumption of imperfect information on the part of employers is combined
with the assumption of heterogeneous workers, i.e. of workers who differ in
their skills and abilities, the following two polar cases are obtained: the first
is characterised by a positive discounted wage differential for migrants with
low skill levels. In contrast to the case of symmetric information, asymmetric
information results in a migration pattern characterised by a reduction in the
quantity and quality of migration or, alternatively, having no effect at all. In
the second case, there are migration incentives for high-skilled workers
through a positive wage differential for them. Either migration of all workers
in a region or migration marks this case by none when introducing
asymmetric information. 
In the long-term, it is realistic to assume that the employer will learn
about the true skill level of the immigrants, so that the immigrants will
receive a wage reflecting their true productivity. This leads to an increased
quantity and quality of migrants. Furthermore, the wages of low-skilled
migrants will increase. This prospect of higher wages in the future results in
a rising migration of high-skilled individuals and, hence, in a rising short-
term wage for the low-skilled persons remaining in the home country. A
change in the skill composition of the migration flows could also be
observed, if the employers of the destination country would make efforts to
receive more information about the skill levels of the immigrants.
Alternatively, it is possible that migrants may invest in signalling devices,
such as certificates. It can be shown that the skilled migrants have the highest
probability of investing in such signals. Furthermore, signalling results in an
U-shaped migration pattern with respect to skill levels, meaning that only the
lowest and the highest skilled individuals will migrate.
To summarise, allowing for asymmetric information in models of labour
migration results in a rather unclear picture of migration: it depends on the
initial migration incentives for workers with different skill levels, the time
horizon of the analysis, investments by employers in information gathering,
as well as investments by migrants in signalling their true skill level.
(d) Family Migration
In the theories discussed above, migration theory focuses on treating
migration as a problem of individual decision-making. A different approach
challenges many of the foregone conclusions by postulating that families or
households typically make migration decisions.Mincer (1978) examines the influence of an increased labour force
participation of wives on the migration decision of families. Household size
and the number of working family members increase the sources of costs and
benefits from migration. Those family members who do not move on their
own initiative often have to face reduced earnings and employment
possibilities in the labour market of the destination country. Therefore, a
family will only migrate, if the gains of one family member internalise the
losses of the other family members. Mincer (1978) shows that increases in
the labour force participation rates of women lead to increased
interdependence of the partner's migration decision, which results in both
less migration and more marital instability. Increased marital instability, in
turn, encourages migration as well as an increase in women's labour force
participation. Furthermore, migration should decrease with increasing family
size.
A different starting point was chosen by the new economics of
migration.11 This approach models migration through the risk-sharing
behaviour of families. In contrast to individuals, households are able to
diversify their resources, such as labour, in order to minimise risks to the
family income. This goal is reached by sending some family members to
work in foreign labour markets, in which wages and employment conditions
are negatively or weakly correlated with those in the local region. In case of
an economic deterioration in the local labour market, this strategy enables a
family to secure their economic well-being through the remittances of family
members working abroad. With this kind of model, it is possible to explain
migration flows in the absence of wage differentials. 
A feature of this new approach is the assumption that families not only
evaluate their income in absolute terms but also in relation to other
households (Stark, 1991). In the 'relative deprivation approach', migration
occurs in order to improve the income of a household in relation to a
reference household. Therefore, not only do the income differentials between
the regions of origin and destination matter for the migration decision but
also the income distribution in the original location. According to this theory,
high income inequality in the home country results in stronger, relative
deprivation, which, in itself, causes higher migration rates. This approach is
also applicable to models with individual decision-making.
The new economics of migration changes the evaluation of the
migration decision by emphasising the family as a decision making unit. This
unit not only wants to maximise income but also seeks to minimise risks to
the family income and to overcome labour market restrictions in the country
18
11 See Stark (1991) for an overview.19
of origin (even if this is not combined with a increased family income). It
should be noted that these models are mainly applicable to countries in which
it is not possible to secure family income through private insurance markets
or governmental programs, as is possible in EU-countries. 
(e) Network Migration
Adynamic view of migration is given by the network approach.12 According
to this framework, migration may become a self-perpetuating process,
because the costs and risks of migration are lowered by social and
information networks. Due to a lack of information about the labour market
in the region of destination, the first person moving faces high costs and
risks. After the migration of the first individual, the monetary and
psychological costs of migration are substantially lowered for the relatives
and friends of this individual in the original location. Furthermore, existing
network ties lower the risks associated with migration to a foreign region,
because individuals can expect help from previously migrated people to find
a job in the destination country. This reduction of costs and risks leads to a
higher net return from mobility and, thus, to a higher migration probability.
Anew migrant raises the number of persons in the region of destination who
themselves hold social ties to the home country, which results in a self-
perpetuating migration process. However, not all people in the sending
region may be affected, hence this process may eventually stop. Another
factor, which weakens this self-feeding process, is the rising wages in the
sending country and the falling wages in the receiving country, which
subsequently lowers the possible benefits of moving. These diminishing
effects are very important for the stability of this model, because it would
otherwise unrealistically predict the migration of whole countries.
Through emphasis on growing network relationships and the associated
reduction in costs and risks, this model suggests a smaller correlation
between wage differentials, employment prospects, and the migration
decision than the neoclassical model. This approach relies not only on the
migration decision of individuals or families at one point in time but also
considers every migration decision of a person to alter the economic and
social situation in which subsequent decisions are made. Achange in relative
economic conditions at one point in time will effect migration decisions in
all future periods by starting additional network migration.
(f) A General View: Push- and Pull-Migration
A general view of labour migration can be given by the push- and pull-
12 See Hugo (1981), Massey (1990a, 1990b), Massey and España (1987). A formal treatment is
given by Bauer (1995), and Bauer and Gang (1998).framework, which integrates the previously discussed theories. Zimmermann
(1995a) defines demand-pull migration and supply-push migration in line
with shifts in the aggregate demand and supply curves of the receiving
economy. Assume a standard price-output diagram like Figure 6(a) with an
upward-sloping supply curve. If aggregate demand increases from D0 to D1,
output and prices (or wage) rise. With rising wages, it is beneficial to allow
immigration in order to avoid inflation and to obtain a further increase in
output. Hence, the supply curve shifts downward from S0 to S1, and the
distance AB in Figure 6(a) is pull migration. Conversely, an inflow of
migrants without a change in demand shifts the supply curve downwards;
prices fall, while output rises. Hence, the distance AC in Figure 6(a) is push
migration. A different case of push migration occurs, if, due to a supply
shock, (a reduction of native labour supply, for instance), the supply curve
shifts upwards (say from equilibrium point C to A in Figure 6(a)). This is (at
least partly) compensated by immigration, so that the equilibrium moves
again down the aggregate demand curve.
To summarise, push-supply migration affects the aggregate supply curve
alone, while pull-demand migration deals with migration (and hence a shift
of the supply curve) that responds to a shift in the demand curve. All internal
factors affecting aggregate demand are considered to be determinants of pull
migration, while all internal or external factors affecting the aggregate supply
and that are also associated with migration are defined to be determinants of
push migration. This is a particular way to define push and pull, namely to
stress the economic context of the inflow of workers.
In the case of a vertical aggregate supply curve (see Figure 6(b)), the
supply and demand curves of labour are only affected by real wages. If the
trade unions (or other institutional constraints) fix real wages above the
equilibrium level, for instance at A1 in Figure 6(c), this results in
unemployment of about A1A2. Immigration (or push migration) shifts the
labour supply curve and increases unemployment and government deficits
due to payments of unemployment compensation. This, in turn, affects
aggregate demand and increases prices, while leaving output constant.
Hence, there is stagflation caused by the immigration of workers or (more
precisely) by push migration.
In practice, push migration arises from various sources. Among them are
positive economic conditions in the receiving countries relative to the
sending regions as measured by variables such as unemployment, wages,
working conditions, social security benefits, and the structure of the
economy. Demographic determinants such as size and age distribution of the
working population also effect the labour supply decisions of migrants.
Family migration and inflow of asylum seekers and refugees are also
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considered to be push migration. Family migration as chain migration may
also be affected by family reunification policies in destination countries. In
one sense, this could be considered pull migration. However, it affects the
supply-curve of the receiving economy alone, hence, this is defined to be
push-supply migration. Only if reunification policies were changed, in
response to changes in aggregate demand, would this be considered pull-
demand migration.
Figure 6:
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2.2.2. Empirical studies on migration
In recent decades extensive econometric investigations of the determinants
of migration and return migration have been undertaken for developed and
developing countries.13 For the purpose of this study, we review research
analysing internal migration as well as international migration, with
particular emphasis on studies for EU member states. We point out the most
important general, empirical findings. We do not discuss single contributions
in detail and omit special methodological problems.14 The review of
empirical studies on migration in this section will make clear that the
international migration issue is not yet sufficiently empirically analysed.
Economic research papers are scarce and rather selective in their treatment
of the relevant question. At best, they deal with a two-country framework and
make no attempt to investigate the common problems of a group of countries
such as the EU. It is further difficult to differentiate between the theoretical
models outlined in the last section, since most of the theoretical approaches
have similar predictions about important determinants of migration.
However, the following review will show that there is strong empirical
evidence that migration is largely determined by the search of individuals for
better economic conditions. 
(a)  Aggregated Data Research
Most empirical studies of migration use data aggregated on the level of a
country or a region due to a lack of available individual data sets or
insufficient computer facilities. Typically, this is either cross-section data or
time-series data. Cross-section studies are mainly applied to internal
migration research, whereas international migration research concentrates
on time-series data. 
Before presenting the main results with regard to the most important
determinants of migration, we will discuss some of the problems regarding
the measurement of migration. Commonly used definitions of the
dependent variable are net migration, gross migration, and the rate of
migration.15 The rate of migration is the number of migrants moving from
the origin to the destination country weighted by the population living in
the country of origin at the beginning of the period of the respective
analysis. This concept takes into account that countries with a large
population also have a higher number of potential migrants. Net migration
13 For a survey of the earlier literature, see Krugman and Bhagwati (1976). Greenwood (1985)
reviews the empirical findings for the developed countries and Todaro (1980) for the developing
countries. The latter reviews especially those papers  related to the Harris-Todaro-model.
14 See Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) for a more detailed analysis.
15 A discussion about the right choice of the dependent variable is given by Krugman and
Bhagwati (1976).23
is defined as the absolute difference between emigration and immigration in
a region. Gross migration is either defined as the number of emigrants in the
country of origin or the number of immigrants in the destination region. The
use of the net migration measure is compounded with problems, if
emigration and immigration flows are correlated. In other words, a migration
model using net migration flows as a dependent variable cannot separate the
various push and pull factors which are responsible for the gross migration
flows in both directions. This could result in biased empirical results.16
Therefore, it is often better to use gross migration flows or gross migration
rates as a dependent variable instead of net migration. 
Migration studies using time-series data often face the problem that they
are unable to discriminate between labour migrants and non-labour migrants.
Because economic reasoning does not motivate the migration decision of
non-labour migrants, the inclusion of both types of migrants could lead to
biased estimation results. For example, a positive effect of income on
migration for labour-migrants may be weakened by a conflicting behaviour
of non-labour migrants.17
In order to summarise the main results of the empirical studies included
in this survey, we pull together the signs of the coefficients on the most
common variables investigated in Table 4. It is striking that nearly all studies
have found a statistically significant positive effect of income or wages in the
destination region or the income or wage differential between the sending
and the receiving region, and a negative effect of wages and income in the
sending country. Allowing for a non-linear influence of the income level on
migration, Faini and Venturini (1994) find a positive coefficient on the
income level of the sending country and a negative influence of its square,
suggesting the existence of a hump-shaped pattern of migration in response
to the home country's income. This result seems to indicate that, in the early
stages of development, increases in the sending country's economic well-
being lead to more, rather than less, migration to the extent that it helps to
relax the financial and educational constraints preventing many would-be
migrants from moving abroad. These results, however, confirm the findings
of earlier empirical studies and hold for internal as well as international
investigations. Furthermore, they are in line with most of the theoretical
models considered in section 2.2.1. 
Findings with regard to unemployment or employment rates as proxies
16 Variables which have the same effects on the flows in both directions will result in upward-
biased coefficients, and variables with different effects on the flows between the countries will
result in downward-biased coefficients (Brosnan and Poot, 1987).
17 Graves (1979) shows in a study of internal migration in the U.S. that the income effect is
significantly negative for retirees, which can be explained by a positive correlation with
unmeasured prices.24
for the employment opportunities in the regions of origin and destination are
more ambiguous. Contrary to what is expected from the theory, some studies
find a negative correlation between the employment opportunities in the
destination region and the size of the migration flow, indicating that
individuals are attracted to regions with a shortage of jobs (Kau and Sirmans,
1976; Fields, 1991; Katseli and Glytsos, 1989; Chies, 1994; Poot, 1995;
Pissarides and McMaster, 1990; Puhani, 1999). Likewise, the employment
opportunities in the sending regions have no clear effect on the migration
decision.18 One reason for the ambiguous results of unemployment variables
could be the use of aggregate data. Initiating this argument, Greenwood
(1985, p. 532) concludes: "Since higher unemployment rates are likely to be
of most concern to the unemployed and perhaps of little or no concern to
those who have a job when they move, the effects of higher unemployment
rates may well not be apparent in studies that attempt to explain population
or labour force migration with aggregate data."
As outlined in the theoretical section, the Harris-Todaro-model concludes
that the most important determinant of migration is expected income gains.
The easiest way to test this hypothesis is to introduce income or wages into
the analysis, not linearly, but rather weighted by the inverse of the
unemployment rates. Confirming former studies, Bowles (1970), Straubhaar
(1988) and Fields (1991) find a high, statistically significant influence of
expected income gains on the migration flow, thus supporting the Harris-
Todaro approach.
In nearly all studies, the distance from the origin to the destination
country shows a statistically significant negative influence on migration
flows, supporting the theoretical considerations of the costs and risks of
movement on the migration decision (Greenwood, 1970; Fields, 1991; Molle
and van Mourik, 1989). Schwartz (1973) analyses the effect of age and
education on the distance elasticity of migration for internal migrants in the
U.S.. His results indicate that age has no effect on the distance elasticity of
migration, whereas the level of education diminishes the elasticity. This
result suggests that the generally expected negative influence of distance on
migration is due to the lack of information. As expected from the network
approach, the stock of migrants from a particular origin in a destination
region has a positive effect on subsequent migration. 
18 Fields (1991) tries to overcome these conflicting results by introducing turnover variables like the
rates of new hires, quits, and layoffs in the specification of the migration equation. His findings
show that individuals are attracted by regions with high rates of new hires and low rates of quits
and layoffs, which is in line with neoclassical and human capital theory. Furthermore, there is some
empirical evidence that employment rates are more important in determining the migration
decision than are wages or income levels (Levy and Wadycki, 1973; Greenwood, 1975, 1981;
Waldorf and Esparza, 1988).25
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Notes: Y: Income or wages; U: Employment opportunities, S: Education, D: Distance between
destination and sending country; MS: Network variables or lagged migration; j: Receiving
country; i: Sending country. If a variable encourages statistically significant migration from i
to j, it receives a + sign; if it discourages at a significant level, it receives a - sign; if the effect
is insignificant, 0 is used.26
Predominantly, the findings with respect to the influence of mean
education and to the age of the total population on migration flows are in line
with the human capital theory. A more sophisticated analysis on the effect of
these variables has shown that migration is increasing with higher mean
education and decreasing with the mean age of the population in the sending
region (Bowles, 1970; Lundborg, 1991b; Schwartz, 1976). These results,
however, should be treated with care. Given the specific socioeconomic
characteristics of an individual such as age, schooling, and work experience,
migration in the human capital model is typically an individual decision
dependent on the expected benefits of moving. The use of aggregate data
may mask important parts of the individual migration decision.
Zimmermann (1995a) explores the strength of push- and pull-migration to
Germany from the major recruitment targeting countries. He argues that
determinants of migration decisions, such as relative wages and relative
unemployment rates, should not matter when immigration is largely driven
by policy measures accounting for economic motives of the receiving
countries, as in Europe's case. Within such a framework, migration flows
should be determined by labour demand and not by labour supply factors.
Zimmermann (1995a) estimates standard OLS regressions of net
immigration from the main recruitment countries of Italy, Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to Germany, including constant, real growth
rates of German gross national product, lagged net immigration, and a time
trend. Real growth was assumed to capture the pull factors, whereas lagged
net immigration (as a measure of persistence and network migration) and the
time trend (as a proxy of unobserved variables operating in the sending and
receiving country) are assumed to capture the push factors. Since regression
results are likely to be affected by the German recruitment stop of 1973, the
paper allows for different parameters until and after 1973.
Measured by the respective coefficient, immigration responded strongly
to the German business cycle and dropped after 1973.19 Furthermore,
Zimmermann's analysis (1995a) reveals that the coefficients for lagged
migration were significant for all sending countries and remained relatively
stable after 1973. The constant did not change after 1973 for all countries,
indicating that the switch in the immigration policy is either neutralised by
other factors or operates only through changes in the other coefficients.
These results indicate that there are elements of push and pull migration
before and after the policy change. Nevertheless, this distinction was
19 Using micro data on German firms, Bauer and Zimmermann (1996) show that this finding can be
explained by increased employment adjustment costs of guestworker employment due to the
recruitment stop of 1973. According to their findings, the temporary employment of guestworkers
acts as buffer for native employment. This buffer function of the guestworker employment
decreased after the recruitment stop due to increased adjustment costs of guestworker employment.27
confirmed by the fact that the cyclical variability of immigration largely
decreased after 1973 in most of the analysed sending countries. Using
Yugoslavia and Turkey as examples, Zimmermann (1995a) shows that the
lagged migration coefficient dominates the immigration process to Germany. 
(b) Micro Data Analysis
Since the early 1980's several surveys of individuals have been conducted.
This data opens up the possibility of overcoming the problems of aggregate
data and of testing the relevance of individual and local characteristics.
Among the most widely used data sets in migration research are the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Surveys
(NLS) and the Census Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) for the U.S.,
or the Sozioökonomische Panel (SOEP) for Germany. Since these data sets
in general have no information regarding the economic and social situation
of immigrants before their emigration, it is not surprising that most of the
empirical research concentrates on internal migration. Only a few data sets
have been collected in the sending countries that could identify the
destination country of immigrants (Lucas, 1985, Taylor, 1986, Ó Gráda,
1986, Stark and Taylor, 1991, and Adams, 1993).20
The main results of these studies are summarised in Table 5 by providing
the signs of the estimated coefficients. We will also discuss studies not
mentioned in Table 5, which have analysed some of the determinants in a
more detailed manner. All studies, which only allow for a linear relationship
between age and the probability of a geographical move have found a
significantly negative coefficient for the age variable. By considering a non-
linear relationship between age and migration, Taylor (1986), Stark and
Taylor (1991), and Adams (1993) have found an inverted U-shaped age-
migration pattern, with individuals between 20 and 33 years of age showing
the highest probability to emigrate. Goss and Paul (1986) demonstrate that it
might be very important not only to control for age but also for general job
skills. As a proxy for these skills, the authors included the years of labour
market experience in the regression equation and found a highly significant
coefficient. Goss and Paul (1986) conclude that studies, which do not control
for the general labour market experience might underestimate the negative
impact of age on the migration decision.21 
Education exhibits a positive correlation with the probability of migration
in all studies of internal migration. In contrast to these results, and with the
exception of Ó Gráda (1986), insignificant or significantly negative
20 Normally, the dependent variable is constructed as a discrete variable, which takes the value 1 if
an individual changes the location between two censuses, and 0 otherwise. This construction
requires the use of binary choice models, such as the probit or the logit model, for estimation.28
coefficients have been found in the international migration context. For
migrants from Botswana to South Africa, this could be traced back to the
apartheid system which reserved skilled jobs for white people and, therefore,
reduced the returns of schooling for skilled black migrants (Lucas, 1985).
The explanation for migration from Mexico to the U.S. and out of Egypt to
is similar. Due to the prevalence of low-skilled labour markets for migrants
in the destination countries, migration for high-skilled individuals is not
beneficial (Adams, 1993; Stark and Taylor, 1991).
Other important personal characteristics explaining the migration of
individuals are marital status, house ownership and the existence of a
network in the receiving country. The empirical findings support Mincer's
(1978) proposition that married persons should exhibit a smaller migration
probability than unmarried individuals. Unexpected results have been found
with respect to the variables indicating whether or not an individual owns a
house. Only Goss and Schoening (1984) and Goss and Paul (1986) have
obtained the expected negative coefficient reflecting the higher costs of
movement for these migrants. Contrary to the findings of studies using
aggregate data, the network variable only seems to be important for
international migration. Nevertheless, more detailed studies support the
conclusion that the network variable is one of the most important
determinants of migration decisions. 
Compared to employed persons, unemployed individuals do not suffer an
earnings loss while moving. A higher likelihood of migration for the
unemployed can, therefore, be derived due to the smaller monetary costs of
movement. This prediction has been strongly supported by the significantly
positive coefficient of pre-move unemployment in the works of Navratil and
Doyle (1977), Schlottmann and Herzog (1984), and Goss and Schoening
(1984). The insignificant coefficient in the study of Burda (1993) on the
readiness of migrating from East Germany to West Germany may be
attributed to the socialist system in the former German Democratic Republic,
in which full employment was secured by the government. 
The unemployment-migration relationship was the subject of detailed
studies by Da Vanzo (1978), Goss and Schoening (1984), and Herzog and
Schlottmann (1984). Using data from the first five waves of the PSID, Da
Vanzo (1978) shows that families whose heads are unemployed are more
likely to migrate. These estimates indicate that local economic conditions
mainly determine the migration decision of the unemployed but have no
impact on employed persons. Furthermore, compared to individuals holding
a job, the unemployed are more responsive to the economic determinants of
the migration decision such as local unemployment rates. This result may
21 A survey of empirical studies regarding network migration is given by Gurak and Caces (1992).29
explain the ambiguous findings regarding local unemployment rates in
studies using aggregate data. Da Vanzo (1978) and Herzog and Schlottmann
(1984) have calculated that individual unemployment doubles the likelihood
of internal migration. Controlling for unemployment duration, Goss and
Schoening (1984) find a decreasing migration propensity with time,
suggesting that regressions excluding this variable will overstate the
migration probability of unemployed persons.
Since the 1980´s, several empirical studies have included household
variables in their regression equations to test propositions of the family
migration approach. None of the studies considering household size as an
independent variable has found a significant influence on the migration
decision. This finding is not compatible to Mincer's (1978) approach.
However, in a detailed analysis of internal family migration in the U.S.,
Shields and Shields (1993) obtain interesting results, which strongly support
the theory of Mincer (1978). They reveal that the higher the wife’s wage rate,
the lower the family migration propensity. Furthermore, the authors have
estimated a wife's education has a positive impact on migration. This depicts
exactly what theory predicts; namely that higher general human capital
implies that migration will less likely result in a loss of household income. 
Household heads are less likely to migrate than other family members,
particularly in the case of international migration. This result not only
reflects different opportunity costs between the international and internal
migration of family heads but also suggests that there are larger moving costs
due to family responsibilities (Stark and Taylor, 1991). Taylor (1986), Stark
and Taylor (1991), and Bilsborrow, McDevitt, Kossoudji, and Fuller (1987)
have estimated a positive impact of the number of adults in a family on the
migration probability of an individual. An extensive analysis of internal and
international migration in Ilocos Norte, a rural province in the Phillipines,
gives further support for the new economics of migration (Root and Jong,
1991). They found that higher education of adult members in a family,
combined with few real estate, results in increased migration of some family
members, whereas network relationships are more important for families



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Signs of coefficients in econometric studies of individual migration
Notes: S: Years of Schooling; M: Married; U: Unemployed before moving; PM: Prior migration
experience; Net: Network Variables; HO: Homeowner; HH: Household Head; HY: House-hold
Income; HS: Household Size. If a variable encourages statistically significant migration from
i to j, it receives a + sign; if it discourages at a significant level, it receives a - sign; if the effect
is insignificant, 0 is used.31
2.3. Evaluation of the size and structure of future East-West migration
2.3.1. Existing estimations of the size and structure of future East-West
migration
It is very difficult to estimate the potential migration flow from East to West
Europe. Studies trying to estimate the size of the migration potential have
arrived at very different conclusions. Newspapers and politicians have
speculated that about 20-40 million East Europeans will emigrate. Estimates
based on opinion polls in the sending countries suggest that between 13 and
27 million people are planning a move to the West (Coleman (1993)),
whereas more modest predictions expect about 5 million people to migrate to
Western Europe (see IOM (1991)). Assuming that 5-40 million would move
to the EU between 1999 and 2003, this would imply an average inflow of
0.2-2.1% of the EU-population size in 1996. Note however, that these
predictions include the former USSR, in other words,  not only those
countries waiting for EU membership. Immigration to Germany in the last
decades has always remained at approximately 1%22 Hence, at the lower end
of these predictions, migration would not seem to be a potential burden.
This view is shared by a recent study of the OECD (1998). It concludes
that the prospect of sizeable migration flows from Eastern to Western Europe
is more fantasy than reality and that it should not be overemphasised in the
agenda for the EU’s enlargement. This assessment is based on the following
arguments and considerations:
•  The OECD expects that within the membership process, the free
movement of persons will be postponed beyond the date of a particular
country’s entry into the EU, as was the case in the membership process of 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
•  Further, the OECD expects that temporary restriction on the movement of
persons will be accompanied by bilateral agreements between current
member countries and the countries applying for membership. Austria and
Germany have already signed such bilateral agreements with several CEEC
countries.23
•  The requirements for becoming a member of the EU could reduce the incen-
tives to migrate. The procedure towards convergence in the key economic and
social indicators as well as the harmonisation of labour standards could lead
to a reduction in the existing differences in the standard of living and
working conditions and, there fore, reduce the incentives to migrate.24
22 See Schmidt and Zimmermann (1992) for a discussion of the German migration experience since
World War II.
23 In the last section, we gave a detailed description of the bilateral agreements in Germany.
24 However, over-hasty implementation of social and economic standards to reach congence between
the CEEC-Countries and the current EU member countries could reduce the job prospects in the
CEEC countries and, thus, increase the incentives to migrate.32
Migration flows following the membership of some CEEC countries may
not necessarily lead to emigration flows directed towards the current EU
member countries. According to the OECD (1998), it is quite likely that a
large part of any migration flow will be directed towards the new member
countries, which are relatively more developed.
Figure 7: 
Estimations of future migration pressures from the East using the
approach of 
Layard et. al. (1992) 
(in 1,000)
Source: Economic Commission for Europe (1997), own calculations.
In order to obtain an initial idea of how many people could migrate from
Eastern to Western Europe after the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe
dissolved, Layard et. al. (1992) used the migration flows from Southern
Europe to Western and Northern European countries and North America in
the 1950s and 1960s and the migration of Mexicans to the United States in
the 1970s and 1980s as a point of reference. According to the authors, these
migration flows provide a minimum estimate of those people in the East who
would want to migrate to the West. They conclude that at least 3% of the
Eastern population hopes to migrate to the West within the next 15 years.
Figure 7 shows the expected migration flows from the countries standing
in line for EU membership, assuming that 3% of the 1995 population in these
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immigration flow from these countries of about 3 million people or about
0.81% of the 1995 EU-population. In other words, accepting the 3%-rule of
Layard et.al. (1992), the EU should expect about 200,000 immigrants or
0.05% of the 1995 EU population per year after a possible enlargement.
Given the fact that yearly immigration to Germany in the last decade has
always been around 1% (Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1992), this number
seems to be negligible.
2.3.2. Evaluation based on surveys in the sending regions
In 1998 the International Organization carried out a comparative study of the
migration potential in 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The
survey is based on a representative sample of 1,000 individuals in 10 of these
countries and 1,200 individuals in the Ukraine. These individuals where
asked whether they wanted to emigrate and for how long, to which country
they would like to emigrate, what they have done to prepare migration, and
what their motivations for leaving or staying would be. In this sub-section,
we briefly summarise the results of this study and compare them to our own
survey conducted during this project.
Figure 8 shows the percentage of individuals answering that they would
emigrate "very likely" or "likely" as well as the intended duration of
migration. Figure 8 illustrates that there is a large potential of short-term
migration, i.e. migration for a few weeks or few months, especially in those
countries bordering the EU. In Slovakia 56% of the respondents and nearly
every second respondent in Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic
answered that they are "most likely" or "likely" to emigrate for a few weeks.
The numbers of individuals planning to migrate for a few months are only
slightly lower. Compared to short-term labour migration, the number of
people who want to work abroad for a longer time period or permanently is
significantly lower, with the exception of Bulgarians who have a higher
potential to emigrate for at least a few years. Between 20% and 27% of the
people in these countries plan to migrate for a few years, with only 7-14%
planning to emigrate permanently. In Romania, however, 21% of the
surveyed individuals plan to emigrate permanently.
22 See IOM (1998) for a detailed description of the survey.34
Figure 8:
Individuals in Central and Eastern Europe who would like to work
abroad and their intended migration duration
(Percentage answering "very likely" or "likely")
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Table 6 shows the target countries indicated by the respondents of the
IOM-survey. The numbers without brackets refer to the percentage of people
who want to work in the respective countries, while the numbers in paren-
theses refer to the percentage of individuals in the survey who plan to emigrate
to the target countries permanently. It appears that Germany and Austria are
by far the most important target countries for both temporary and permanent
migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Migrants from the Czech Republic
and from the Ukraine were interested in moving to almost all EU-countries.
These numbers confirm the importance of existing networks for the direction
of migration flows. As we have discussed in section 2.1., most migrants from
Central and Eastern Europe live in Germany and Austria. The results of the
IOM-survey indicate that existing networks are important for the choice of
the target countries' potential migrants. This conclusion is confirmed by the
fact that one of the most important reasons for migration among the individuals
in the IOM-survey was the experience of people who have already migrated.
Along with the experience of former migrants, the idea that living conditions
and wages were better abroad was by far the most important reason for
leaving the home country. The IOM-study also indicates that young and
highly educated individuals have the highest propensity to work abroad.35
Table 6: Target countries for migrants in Central and Eastern
European Countries (Percentage of whole sample)
Source:  IOM (1998), Table 1.
Notes: Figures in brackets indicate the percentages of people who want to emigrate; figures without
brackets indicate the percentages of people who want to work abroad temporarily. For
Slovenia there is no accurate information because the question was asked "to work or to
emigrate in" rather than separating work and emigration.
It is well known that the desire to migrate is very different from actual
migration. Therefore, the numbers reported in Figure 8 are likely to be much
higher than the real migration flows that will occur. One way to get a clearer
picture of the potential migration flows is to look at the actual steps taken by
potential migrants in realising their plans. Table 7 shows the results of the
IOM-study with regard to the migration preparations of the individuals
surveyed. First, it should be noted that the numbers of individuals who have
taken concrete steps towards emigration is by far lower than the number of
people who plan to migrate (see Figure 8). Second, note that the types of
respondents' preparations (learning the foreign language, obtaining
qualifications, and obtaining information) are not necessarily good indicators
for a move. At least the knowledge of a foreign language and higher
qualifications improve the labour market possibilities in the home country as
well and, therefore, might actually reduce the propensity to migrate. With the
exception of the Poles, the number of individuals who have taken very
concrete steps towards migration (applying for a job or work permit, selling
property, and looking for a place to live) is very low in all countries.
Country Target countries
Germany Austria       France Britain Scandinavia Other EU
Poland 36 (15) 4 (3) 5 (5) 6 (7) 5 (5) 4 (5)
Czech Republic 38 (5) 26 (6) 17 (6) 24 (5) 17 (10) 4 (5)
Slovakia 17 (0) 8 (1) 2 (1) 4 (0) 1 (1) 3 (1)
Hungary 25 (10) 13 (6) 2 (2) 3 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1)
Slovenia 1 (0) 4 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
Croatia 43 (26) 9 (6) 3 (2) 4 (2) 6 (7) 6 (6)
Romania 12 (5) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (1)
Bulgaria 15 (5) 2 (1) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 5 (2)36
Table 7: Preparations for emigration (in%)
Source:  IOM (1998), Table 2
Notes: PL: Poland; CR: Czech Republic; SK: Slovakia; HU: Hungary; SLO: Slovenia; 
CRO: Croatia; BUL; Bulgaria; ROM:Romania.
Three main conclusions can be derived from the results of the IOM-study
for the migration potential from the East to the West after a potential EU-
enlargement: 
•  First, the migration potential is by far lower than the numbers reported in
newspapers or used by politicians. 
•  Second, the likely pattern of migration in the medium term is short-term
labour migration to improve household earnings. The potential for permanent
emigration lies between 1% and 2% of the population in the sending
countries. Even though there are huge economic differences between the
potential new EU-member countries and the current EU-member states (see
the next section), the migration potential will very likely decline with the
improvement of living standards in the Central and Eastern European
countries. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the two most
important reasons why individuals migrate are better living conditions and
higher wages in the current EU-countries.
•  Third, migration from the East to the West is most likely only a problem
for Germany and Austria, to which most of the potential migrants aim to go.
In the process of writing this report, we have conducted a survey among
446 scientists and administrative persons in the potential sending countries.26
These persons were sent a questionnaire via e-mail. This questionnaire and a
Table with descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix A of this report.
Unfortunately, the response to this survey was very low; we received only 20
responses to our questionnaire.  
PL CR SK HU SLO CRO BUL ROM
Learned foreign language 39 24 17 13 14 16 10 13
Obtained qualifications 21 17 9 10 13 12 7 9
Sold property 11 1 2 0 2 3 0 2
Obtained information  38 13 14 8 9 12 15 14
Applied for jobs 28 5 5 4 2 4 6 4
Found place to live 23 5 4 2 2 4 3 1
Applied for permit 24 3 3 3 2 3 5 2
Contacted people 16 3 2 6 2 5 7 4
Other 12 4 2 2 3 7 2 437
According to our survey an emigration of about 200.000 people or 2.7%
of the respective country's population is expected on average. Germany and
Austria are expected to be the most important receiving countries, followed
by the UK. It is further expected that the migration flow mainly consists of
temporary skilled labour migrants. Regarding the most important reasons for
emigration, the respondents ranked the possibility to earn more money in the
West highest, followed by better employment prospects and a better social
security system. Even though these numbers are far from being
representative due to the small sample size, the results of our survey are in
line with the results of the IOM-survey described above.
2.3.3. Evaluation based on the economic and demographic situation in
Eastern and Western Europe
The future of East-West migration largely depends on the political stability
in the East and the economic and demographic development in Eastern and
Western Europe. With respect to the political situation in the East, it can be
observed that democratic structures and human rights have been developing
at a rapid pace. Therefore, politically motivated migration may gradually
disappear but it cannot be completely excluded in the future.
As we have discussed in section 2.2., economic theories of migration
conclude that the economic conditions in the sending country in relation to
the receiving country are important determinants for the individuals'
migration decision. Table 8 exhibits some economic indicators of West and
East European countries in 1993. The process of transforming the previously,
centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe into market economies does
not progress at the same rate in all transition countries.
The GDP growth rates in 1997 indicate that the economic situation in
some Eastern countries has improved significantly. Following the standard
migration theory (see section 2.2.1.), this should lower the migration
pressure. On average, the GDPin Eastern Europe fell between 5.0% and 13%
in 1991. Between 1993 and 1997 most of the East European countries
experienced substantial growth in production. In 1996 and 1997, however,
economic growth in all Eastern European countries once again decreased,
while Bulgaria and Romania experienced  negative growth rates.  Due to the
existing dependency of most of these countries on the Russian economy, the
future economic development of these countries is difficult to predict.
However, stronger economic connections with the EU might help to
overcome dependency on the Russian economy and to stabilise economic
development in these countries.
26 82 in Estonia, 18 in Hungary, 43 in Latvia, 189 in the Czech Republic, 51 in Lithuania, 2 in
Romania, 7 in Slovakia, 21 in Slovenia, 31 in Poland, and 2 in Bulgaria.38






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Sachverständigenrat (1996/97), p. 33 and Sachverständigenrat (1997/98), p. 30.40
Figure 9: GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP US $)
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Source: United Nations (1997), own calculations.41
In all East European countries, the transition to a market economy was
followed by a sharp increase in unemployment, which, at least officially, did
not exist under central planning. In 1997, the unemployment rates in Eastern
Europe varied widely from 4.5% in the Czech Republic to 14% in Bulgaria.
In 1997, excluding Luxembourg, none of the EU countries had less than 5%
unemployment. Only Slovakia and Bulgaria had a higher unemployment rate
than the EU average. Thus, there seems to be little potential for large-scale
movements from the East to the West resulting from employment
differentials. Note however, that there are potential problems in comparing
the unemployment figures in Table 8. These problems are due to different
definitions of unemployment and different ways to measure unemployment.
Despite high unemployment rates in the West, there is a demand for high-
skilled technical and professional workers, especially in information
technology, as well as for low-skilled service workers. For instance, CIS
specialists in space technology, lasers, low-temperature physics and
superconductivity, some fields of medicine, and computer software may be
in great demand in the West (Coleman, 1993). If these high-skilled workers
want to live permanently in the West, their emigration may lead to a brain
drain in the East European countries. This will have negative consequences
for their future economic development. In the case of temporary migration,
however, these high-skilled workers may become acquainted with modern
Western techniques and, therefore, help their source country after returning.
Another important factor encouraging migration in the short-term is the
persistently high income differentials between the East and the West. Figure
9 shows the GDP per capita in the EU and Central and Eastern European
countries adjusted for purchasing power parity in US$. This figure shows
that the average income in all EU countries in 1995 was higher than the
income in Eastern European countries. For instance, in 1995 the average
income in the UK was 18,360 US$. In Slovenia the average income was
58.4% of the average income in the UK, and in the Czech Republic 51.8%.
Note however, that in Portugal the average income was about 69.9% of the
average income in the UK, and in Greece 63.5%. In other words, comparing
the poorest EU countries with the richest East European countries, the wage
differential and, hence, the incentives to migrate do not seem to differ greatly.
At the lower end of the spectrum, however, people from Lithuania and Latvia
receive only 21.9% and 17.8% of the average income in the UK, respectively.
One of the main problems of the transition countries has been inflation. Table
8 shows the substantial differences in inflation rates between East and West
Europe. All East European countries have higher inflation rates than the EU
countries; in particular inflation in Bulgaria and Romania is a large problem.
Policy measures against inflation may affect employment negatively and,
therefore, increase the migration pressure. 42
In the long-run, differences in demographic developments may be an
important driving force behind the upcoming era of push-migration
(Zimmermann, 1995). Stagnating, ageing populations tend to attract
migrants, while young and large populations generate more mobile
individuals. As Table 9 predicts, the share of the population over the age of
65 will rise in all EU-countries. This ageing process is the lowest in the
United Kingdom; the size of the over-65 group will increase from 15.7% to
19.4% between 1990 and 2025.The ageing process is the highest in Greece;
the size of the same group will increase from 13.8 % to 22.2 % over the same
period. Conversely, with the exception of Ireland, the working age (15-64)
population share declines in all EU-countries by 2-5 percentage points over
the same period. Table 9 indicates large differences in the demographic
situation and future development among East European countries. Whereas
Bulgaria and Hungary show similar demographic developments as the West
European countries, all other East European countries are characterised by
relatively smaller age groups beyond age 65 and relatively larger cohorts for
ages 0-14. This difference in the demographic pattern between most of the
East European countries and the EU countries may suggest a migration
potential for young people in the East, due to labour shortages in the West,
especially in occupations usually taken by young people (Coleman, 1993). In
the long run there may even be a demand for young immigrants in Western
Europe due to its ageing population. In the West there will be fewer and
fewer people of working age to support each elderly person, leading to a
substantial problem for the pension system in the future. Importing young
skilled workers, who can help to alleviate such problems, might generate a
major fiscal advantage for the ageing Western countries. 
An interesting question in the East-West migration discussion is which
countries are likely to attract which migrants? This will largely be a question
of ethnic networks. As we have discussed in section 2.1. of this report, most
of the migrants from Central and Eastern European countries end up in
Germany. Due to historical connections with Hungary, the former CSFR, and
Bulgaria, Austria seems to be another important receiving country for
Eastern European emigrants. Following the theory of network migration and
assuming that future migration streams will flow along existing ethnic
networks. East-West migration is likely to be mainly a problem for Germany
and Austria, whereas South-North migration will also affect other EU
member countries.
To summarise, it is unclear to what extent the economic differences
between East and West Europe will cause out-migration in the short-run.
Previous experience with migration within the EU suggests that labour
mobility is rather slow in adjusting wage and unemployment differentials.43
Given this experience, the lower bound of the predictions (3% of the
population in the potential sending regions) described in the last section
seems to be the most likely scenario of future migration pressure from the
East to the West. In the long-run, a shrinking population and an ageing labour
force in Western Europe combined with a growing population in Eastern
Europe may encourage migration from the East to the West.   
Table 9: Demographic indicators*
Country Total  Total      Age Structure
Population  Population               1990                             2025
1995 Growth 15-64 65+ 15-64          65+
(Millions)    1994-2025
(%)
West European Countries
Belgium 10.2 -1.0 67.0 14.9 62.6 21.7
Denmark 5.2 -1.9 67.2 15.6 63.1 21.7
France 58.1 5.9 65.7 14.0 62.2 21.2
Germany 81.6 4.1 68.7 14.6 64.1 20.5
Greece 10.5 -1.0 66.9 13.8 62.2 22.2
Italy 57.3 -2.8 68.6 14.1 63.3 22.3
Ireland 3.6 2.9 61.3 11.4 61.7 17.8
Netherlands 15.5 15.7 69.0 12.7 64.2 19.8
Portugal 9.8 2.0 66.0 13.1 64.3 18.9
Spain 39.2 3.6 66.9 13.4 63.7 20.2
United Kingdom 58.5 4.3 65.3 15.7 63.6 19.4
EU 371.9 3.3 67.3 14.5 63.4 20.7
Central and East European Countries
Bulgaria 8.9 -1.1 66.5 13.0 64.6 17.8
Former CSFR 15.7 14.0 65.3 11.7 64.6 16.4
Hungary 10.5 -1.0 66.2 13.2 64.5 18.0
Poland 38.5 13.8 64.7 10.0 63.3 16.3
Romania 23.4 12.4 66.0 10.4 65.2 14.3
CIS 284.5 21.1 64.9 9.3 64.1 14.1
Source: Eurostat (1991), United Nations Population Fund (1994), United Nations Population Division
(1992), own calculations.44
2.3.4. Evaluation based on econometric results
Afinal method to evaluate the potential migration flows from Eastern Europe
to the current EU member countries after a possible EU enlargement is to
rely on an econometric analysis of the determinants of internal migration
within the EU and to use the results in order to simulate the potential future
migration flows from the East to the West. The main idea behind this
approach is to infer the potential migration flows, resulting from a planned
enlargement, from the migration experience of the EU with past
enlargements. As a point of reference, we estimated the determinants of
migration from Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the other EU member
countries. Greece joined the EU in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986. In all
three cases, migration from these countries to the other EU countries was
temporarily restricted. In the case of Greece, free labour migration was
introduced in 1988; this occurred in Spain and Portugal in 1992. 
In order to analyse the determinants of migration from Greece, Spain, and
Portugal to the other EU member countries, we collected data on the number
of persons emigrating from these three countries to the other EU countries
from 1985 to 1997, as well as the population, unemployment rates, and real
GDP per capita in the sending and receiving countries. The resulting panel
data set is then used to estimate a log-linear equation using a fixed effects
panel estimator. As dependent variable we used the emigration rate, defined
as the number of persons emigrating in a particular year divided by the
population of the respective sending country in the previous year. As
explanatory variables we used the relative unemployment rate, defined as the
unemployment rate in the sending country divided by the unemployment rate
in the respective receiving country, and the relative real GDP per capita,
defined as the real GDP per capita in the sending country over the real GDP
per capita in the respective receiving country. These estimations were
performed on three different samples: the total sample over the entire period
from 1985 to 1997, a sub-sample of the period during which labour mobility
between Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the other EU members was restricted
(Greece: 1985-1987, Spain and Portugal: 1985-1991), and, finally, a sub-
sample during which free mobility between all countries was allowed
(Greece: 1989-1997, Spain and Portugal: 1992-1997). The data set, the
estimation method, and the results are reported in Appendix B.
In the second step, we used the estimated coefficients reported in
Appendix B together with the relative unemployment rates and relative GDP
per captia between the CEEC countries and the current EU member countries
(see Table 8 and Figure 9) to simulate the potential emigration rates from the
CEEC countries to the EU. The results of the simulations are reported in
Table 10.45
Table 10:
Simulated emigration rates from East Europe to the European Union
based on econometric results (in % of the population in the sending
country)
Total Restricted Mobility Free Mobility
Poland 1.83 1.29 6.11
Czech Republic 0.46 0.74 0.33
Slovakia 0.41 0.36 0.95
Hungary 1.05 0.94 2.20
Slovenia 0.15 0.22 0.13
Romania 6.54 4.06 27.73
Bulgaria 3.16 1.80 15.72
Notes: The estimation procedure and the estimation results are reported in Appendix B. The column
Total refers to simulations based on the estimation results for the entire sample period from
1985 to 1997; the column Restricted Mobility refers simulations based on the estimation
results for the sub-period during which mobility between the three sending countries and the
other EU countries was restricted (Greece: 1985-1987; Spain and Portugal: 1985-1991); the
column Free Mobility refers simulations based on the estimation results for the sub-period
during which free mobility between the sending countries and the other receiving countries was
allowed (Greece: 1989-1997; Spain, Portugal: 1992-1997).
Table 10 shows that the largest emigration rates can be expected from
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, mainly as a result of their relatively high
income disadvantage. Among the countries with which the EU has already
started preparatory talks about possible EU membership, the simulated
emigration rates range between 0.2% of the population in Slovenia and 2%
of the population in Poland. Table 10 further depicts important differences
between a scenario of restricted and a scenario of free labour mobility. With
the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the simulated emigration
rates are significantly higher in a scenario of free labour mobility.27 In the
case of restricted labour mobility, the simulated emigration rates range
between a minimum of 0.22% of the Slovenian population and a maximum
of 4% of the Romanian population. Especially in the countries with a
relatively high earnings disadvantage (Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria), the
27 In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the simulation results are driven by the relative
unemployment rate, which is not statistically significant different from 0 in the scenario of free
labor mobility.46
simulated emigration rates increase significantly in a scenario of free labour
mobility. In Poland, for example, the simulated emigration rates increase
from 1.3% in a scenario of restricted labour mobility to 6% with free labour
mobility.
Due to several reasons, one should interpret the simulation results with
care. First, in our estimations we were not able to control for important
determinants of migration such as distance and network migration, both of
which could bias our estimation results. Second, the simulated emigration
rates are long-run predictions; short-run emigration rates may be higher.
Third, we were unable to differentiate between temporary and permanent
emigration. Finally, the observed income differences between the CEEC-
countries and the EU-countries are much higher as it was the case when
Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EU. For example, when Greece,
Spain and Portugal joined the EU, the relative real GDP compared to the EU
average ranged between 59.6% in Greece 75.5% in Spain. In 1997 the real
GDP of the countries applying for membership range between 23% in
Rumania and 59% in Slovenia of the EU average (see Figure 9). With regard
to the relative unemployment rates, the situation of the East European
countries comes closer to the situation when the Southern European
countries joined the EU (see Table 8). Therefore, the simulation results in
Table 10 are out-of-sample predictions, which could suffer from a large error.
Overall, the results from this section support our earlier conclusions, namely
that it is reasonable to expect long-run emigration rates from the East to the
West of between 2-3% of the population in the sending region.
2.4. Summary
In this section we evaluated the potential migration flows from Central and
Eastern Europe to the EU after a potential enlargement. In the first two parts
of this section, we described the current migration situation vis a vis Central
and Eastern Europe and provided a survey of the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on the determinants of international migration. This
review revealed that economic differences between sending and receiving
countries as well as existing migration networks are very important in
explaining migration flows. In the second part of this section, the potential
migration flows towards the East after an EU enlargement were evaluated
and based on four different approaches: (i) we used estimates of the size of
East-West migration following the opening of the Central and Eastern
European countries in the early 1990s; (ii) we employed surveys conducted
in the potential sending countries; (iii) based on the economic and
demographic situation in Eastern and Western Europe, we gave a qualitative
evaluation of the migration pressure; and (iv) we used econometric and47
simulation methods to study the determinants of internal migration in the
current EU in order to predict future East-West migration.
The four evaluation methods lead us to the following conclusions:
•  In the long-run, it could be expected that about 2-3% of the population in
Central and Eastern European countries will migrate to the West.
•  Existing surveys in the potential sending countries indicate that the short-
term migration potential might be higher.
•  Due to existing migration networks, East-West migration will largely be
a problem for Germany and Austria.
•  The migration flows from the East to the West are expected to be prima-
rily temporary.
•  The migrants are expected to be relatively skilled.48
3. THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS OF EAST-WEST
MIGRATION
3.1.  The theoretical framework
Because natives often fear the competition of foreign labour, the native
labour market consequences of immigration have become one of the most
discussed topics concerning migration. This debate has gained the increasing
attention of employees, media, and politicians. Even the most simple
theoretical model, however, does not result in a clear answer whether or not
immigration leads to negative labour market effects on natives.28 In the
following section, we give a graphical exposition of the most simple
theoretical model used in economics to derive the labour market effects of
immigration. This simple model gives some intuition for the most important
economic adjustments of the labour market in the receiving country, in
response to the immigration of labour. Thereafter, we give a graphical
explanation of a more complicated model. This model takes into account the
possibility of labour market rigidities and is, therefore, more suitable for
European labour markets than the basic model. We will use this model later
in order to simulate the potential labour market effects of migration after a
possible enlargement of the EU to the East.
3.1.1. A simple model of the labour market effects of immigration
Assume a simple framework, in which the country of origin produces a
single good by means of capital and homogeneous labour. Figure 10 shows
the labour market of the receiving country. Before immigration occurs, the
labour market of the receiving country is in an equilibrium (i.e. labour
demand equals labour supply) at point b with a wage w1 and employment L1.
Immigration would lead to an outward shift of the labour supply curve from
S1 to S2. This labour supply effect of immigration leads to a new equilibrium
at point c, which is characterised by a higher total employment L2 and a
lower wage w2. Note that the employment of natives has decreased from
employment level L1 to L3. The employment level of foreigners is shown as
the distance between employment level L2 and L3. According to this simple
model, immigration leads to a lower employment level of natives and lower
wages.  How much the employment of natives and wages decrease crucially
depends on the shapes of the labour demand and supply curve. If one
considers a case, in which the labour demand and the labour supply curve are
28 See Greenwood and McDowell (1986) and Bauer (1997a) for an overview of the theoretical litera-
ture on the labor market effects of immigration. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) reviewed the empirical
literature for the U.S.. See Zimmermann (1995a,1995b) for Europe.49
29 To describe the shapes of the demand and supply curves, economists use the concept of elasticities.
For example, the labor demand elasticities could be interpreted as the percentage decrease of labor
demand that occurs after a 1% decrease in  wages. The labor supply elasticity shows the percentage
increase of labor supply which occurs after a 1% increase in wages. If the supply curve is very
steep, then a 1% increase in wages leads only to a small increase in the labor supply. In this case,
economists say, supply is very inelastic. If the labor demand curve is very steep, than a 1% increase
in wages leads only to small reduction in labor demand. In this case, labor demand is called
relatively inelastic.
both very steep, or, as economists say, very inelastic,29 the demand and
supply of labour react very slowly to a wage change. Given a particular
amount of immigration, the reduction of wages will be the greater, the more
inelastic labour demand and labour supply.
Figure 10:
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Figure 10 also allows us to analyse the income and distribution effects of
immigration. Before immigration occurs, the country produces an output,
which is described by the area ab L10. The income of native workers can be
described by the area w1 bL10 and the income of capital owners by the area
abw1. Immigration leads to an increase in the output of the country from ab
L10 to acL20. The income of the immigrants is described by the area ecL2L3.
Because of immigration, the income of native workers decreases to w2eL30,
and the income of the capital owners increases to acw2. To summarise,50
immigration leads to an increased output and to a redistribution of income
from native workers to the owners of capital.
In using this model, it has been argued that the negative effects of
immigration for native workers are overemphasised, since the model
neglects indirect labour demand effects. First, immigrants are consuming
goods; thus, the demand for goods increases. This increased demand leads to
an increase in the demand for labour. In Figure 10 this increased demand for
labour, induced by the consumption of immigrants, is shown as a shift of the
labour demand curve to the right. Due to this shift, the employment of natives
and wages increase. Whether the indirect effect is able to compensate the
direct effects of immigration depends on how much the labour demand curve
shifts to the right. If the increase in labour demand is substantial enough (see
D3 in Figure 10), immigration could lead to an increase of wages and the
employment of natives.
3.1.2. The effect of immigration in rigid labour markets
The simple model outlined above assumes that there is only one type of
labour and that wages can fully adjust to changes in the labour market. In the
European context, however, it is important to consider imperfections in the
labour market when analysing the effects of immigration. For example,
wages may not be flexible downwards due to the behaviour of unions or due
to minimum wages. In this section, we outline a model, which takes into
consideration that labour is heterogeneous and that there might be wage
rigidities in the labour market. As an example for the theoretical treatment of
a rigid labour market in the context of migration, we use a theoretical model
in which trade unions set the wages for unskilled labour. Even though this
model seems to be quite special, it shows the employment and wage effects
of immigration in rigid labour markets and could be easily applied to other
sources of labour market rigidity such as minimum wages. We will further
use the model in section 3.3. of this report to simulate the potential labour
market effects of increased East-West migration after a potential EU
enlargement. 
If labour is homogeneous, the standard competitive framework predicts
an increase in total welfare at the expense of labour, because the wage rate is
lower after immigration. Perhaps due to the behaviour of unions wages may
not be flexible downwards. (See Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann (1994) for
a theoretical treatment of this issue.) If union behaviour remains unaffected
by immigration, unemployment may rise substantially. On the other hand, the
pressure of immigration may affect unions’ wage-employment choice. If
labour is heterogeneous, the key issue for the evaluation of the wage effects
of immigrant labour is whether foreigners are substitutes or complements to51
native workers.30 To simplify the analysis, we assume that there are only two
types of labour: qualified or educated workers and less-qualified or less-
educated workers. We will call the former skilled and the latter unskilled
workers. One reasonable assumption is that skilled and unskilled workers are
complements. Then one possible scenario is that immigrants are substitutes
to unskilled natives and complements to skilled natives. Hence, increased
immigration may depress wages and (possibly) increase unemployment of
unskilled workers while inducing the reverse effects for the skilled natives.
The opposite case may happen in a scenario with skilled immigration.
While a formal treatment is left to Appendix C, we briefly outline the
main framework and provide some intuition. The economy is assumed to
produce a single output according to production technology which utilises
capital, skilled labour, and unskilled labour. Output price is considered to be
pre-determined and both types of labour are complements (the standard
case). Natives supply input factors at fixed levels. Immigrants are either
perfect substitutes to unskilled natives or to skilled natives. They do not carry
any capital with them and have no effect on the demand-side of the economy.
The level of immigration relative to the native population is fixed by
governmental rules. We concentrate on pure labour immigration. A
monopoly union sets the wage in the market for unskilled labour; employers
then choose the level of employment in this market, whereas competitive
forces determine the market wage of skilled labour. Nevertheless, the union
cares about the wages of the skilled workers, who are affected by the
employment level determined in the market of the unskilled workers. This
spill-over is generated by a standard neoclassical production technology.
The consequences of skilled or unskilled labour immigration in such a
model can be studied by using Figure 11. The upper panel considers the case
of unskilled labour immigration. While the market for skilled labour is
controlled by competitive forces (see A0 in Figure (11a)), the monopoly
union sets a wage level higher than the equilibrium wage in the market for
unskilled labour (see B0 in Figure (11b)). This causes unemployment at level _
L_L0 for the unskilled. The union is concerned about the earnings and
employment of both the skilled and unskilled workers. Since unskilled
immigrants (see the shift of the labour supply curve in Figure (11b)) replace
natives and, therefore, lower the employment level of unskilled native
workers, the union accepts a lower wage level for the unskilled (B1). Since
both types of labour are complements, the increased unskilled employment
(L1) shifts the demand curve for skilled workers upwards (see Figure (11a)),
30 Two types of labor are substitutes, if an increased employment of one type of labor decreases the
demand for the other type. When the two types of labor are complements, an increase in the
employment of one type of labor results in an increased demand for the other type of labor.52
and the wage rate of skilled workers increases (see A1 in Figure (11a)). As a
result the unskilled wage falls and drives the economy in the direction of the
equilibrium point of a competitive labour market. In general, native
unemployment may rise or fall. However, according to equation (A8) in the
parametric framework chosen in Appendix C, the employment effect for
unskilled natives is negative.
The case of skilled labour immigration is more obvious. The increasing
stock of skilled labour (see the shift of the supply curve in Figure (11c))
drives the equilibrium point down from C0 to C1. The demand for unskilled
labour increases due to complementarity (see the shift of the demand curve
in Figure (11d)) and results in a higher level of employment of unskilled
workers, whether or not the union decreases or increases the unskilled wage.
While it does not seem plausible that the union would increase the unskilled
wage so strongly that native employment falls, the theoretical model in
Appendix C predicts that wages would fall (see D1 in Figure (11d) and
equation (A9) in Appendix C). The increased level of unskilled employment
shifts the demand curve for skilled labour upwards again (see C2 in Figure
(11c)). Hence, immigration of skilled workers will most likely cause a
decrease in the wages of the unskilled and a decline in native unemployment.
The analysis of this section suggests that there are complicated issues
determining whether one can expect gains from immigration and which
group will receive them. In a competitive (equilibrium) framework in both
labour markets, natives will receive total gains, but those workers who are
substitutes to the immigrants will lose. In the union model outlined here,
effects are similar in nature. If unskilled labour immigrates, there will be
gains for skilled natives, but unskilled natives will receive lower wages and
face higher unemployment. To what extent natives still receive gains on the
whole depends on the specific situation. In the case of skilled labour
immigration, both wages and unemployment will decline, and the total
income of natives will increase.
How important are the derived effects? In the following section, we will
survey the existing empirical evidence on the labour market effects of
immigration in Europe. In section 3.3. we will use EU data to simulate the
model outlined in this section. These simulations will carefully study the
polar cases and provide some estimates of the potential effects. 53
Figure 11: 
Labour market effects of immigration in the case of rigid wages
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3.2.  Empirical studies on the labour market effects of migration: A
survey
3.2.1. The effect of immigration on native wages
Beginning with Grossman's analysis (1982), a large number on empirical
studies on the wage effects of immigration in the US have been undertaken.
Asurvey of this research is given by Borjas (1994). Most of these studies did
not support the hypothesis that native Americans are strongly and adversely
affected by immigration (Borjas, 1994). Compared to the United States, the
empirical evidence for the European labour market is relatively scarce and
not as clear cut. There are however some empirical results for Germany,
Austria, and France. To our knowledge no similar studies exist for the UK.31
Overwhelmingly, these studies conclude that the wage effects of immigration
are negligible or non-existent and, in some cases, even positive. In this
section we review the existing evidence for EU countries. A summary is
contained in Table 11.  
The first contribution to the native wage effects of immigration has been
made by DeNew and Zimmermann (1994a, 1994b) and Haisken-DeNew and
Zimmermann (1995). They employ a reduced form model of the labour
market by regressing the effects of the foreigner share in an industry on
individual log hourly wages. The sign of the estimated coefficient of this
foreigner share variable determines whether immigrants are substitutes or
complements to native workers, i.e. whether they have a negative or a
positive effect on the wages of natives.32 Overall, DeNew and Zimmermann
(1994a) find that a 1% increase in the employment share of guestworkers
decreases hourly wages of all natives by 0.35% (see Table 11). They also
obtain significantly different effects of immigration on different groups of
native workers. According to their results, a 1% increase in the share of
guestworkers results in a decrease in wages of native blue collar workers by
0.45%, whereas the wages of white collar workers increase by 0.12%. The
estimated coefficient for the latter group however, appears to be statistically
insignificant. Examining the industry-specific effects of the foreigner share,
it turns out that some industries gain. Overall, positive elasticities are found
for natives working in Transportation (+0.07) and Wholesale/Retail
(+0.023), whereas large negative elasticities are found for natives in
31 See Hatton and Wheatley Price (1998) for a recent survey of the migration literature for the UK
32 To control for possible endogeneity, the foreigner share variable has been instrumen by 
industry dummies, industry value-added growth rates, and an overall and industry-specific
time-trend. Regressions further include a number of individual and industry-specific control
variables together with a set of dummies to control for fixed industry effects. The resulting
equation has been estimated for various occupational groups by a random effects 2-stage
GLS method using the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) from 1984 to 1989.55
In using the same framework and dataset but restricting the analysis to
blue-collar workers, DeNew and Zimmermann (1994b) find smaller effects
(see Table 11). The estimated elasticity of -0.16 suggests that the wages of
native blue collar workers are reduced by 0.16%, if the employment share of
guestworkers increases by 1%. Compared to the existing evidence in the
U.S., even this elasticity is rather large. Furthermore, DeNew and
Zimmermann (1994b) show that immigrants experience the highest negative
effects of immigration, themselves. Disaggregating the foreigner industry
share by industry and region and using the first nine waves of the GSOEP
(1984-1992), Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1995) have found
significantly different effects in relation to their 1994 studies. Overall, the
estimates exhibit a complementary effect of immigration. Looking at
different occupational groups, Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1995)
find no significant immigration wage effects on native white collar workers,
but a significantly positive wage effect on native blue-collar workers with
more than 20 years of labour market experience. 
Bauer (1998) replicates the studies of DeNew and Zimmermann using the
1994 wave of the Beschäftigtenstatistik, which is comparable to the U.S.
Labour Force Survey. As can be seen from Table 8, his estimation of the
overall wage elasticity is much smaller than those obtained by DeNew and
Zimmermann (1994a, 1994b). Bauer (1998) further disaggregates native and
foreign workers according to their occupational status and their skill level.
The results of this analysis imply that native unskilled blue collar workers are
complements to all immigration groups. Native skilled blue collar workers
suffer from the immigration of foreign unskilled and skilled blue collar
workers and can expect increasing wages in the case of an immigration of
white collar workers. Bauer (1998) also reveals, however, that native white
collar workers are substitutes to all groups of foreign workers. From a
theoretical point of view, the latter result is hard to justify.
Pischke and Velling (1994) adopt a rather different approach. Unlike the
studies review so far, they use an earnings function approach. They employ
the change in the wage level as the dependent variable and the change in the
number of foreigners in relation to the entire local population. They use the
age group 15 to 64 in a labour market region as an exogenous variable.
Pischke and Velling (1994) employ a data set from the German Federal
Research Institute for Regional Geography and Regional Planning
(Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung) which
separates Germany into 328 counties (Federal Planning Regions).33 Pischke
Investment (-0.56) and the Primary Sector (-0.43). DeNew and Zimmermann
(1994) conclude that immigration measured by the share of foreigners in
different industries have an overall but small effect on German wages. 56































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Velling (1994) estimate a positive and significant wage effect of
immigration. A one percent increase in the share of foreigners leads to a
maximum of a 3.29% increase in the wage level, implying a complementary
effect of foreign labour (see Table 11). A possible problem with these
findings is that the data set used also includes economically inactive
foreigners such as asylum seekers, who generally have no work permit.
Allowing for this, regressions for foreigners with Turkish nationality are
estimated which yield similar results as the estimation for all foreigners. A
one percent increase in the share of Turkish foreigners leads to a 1.88 percent
increase in the wage level. Pischke and Velling (1994) add to the
understanding of the native labour market consequences of immigration by
analysing local labour markets. They are not able to separate between low
qualified and high qualified labour. This, however, is important, for
immigration is supposed to have a negative wage effect, particularly for low
qualified labour. Furthermore, they study a boom period, which might bias
their results.
For the period of 1984 to 1991, Hatzius (1994) applies a model similar to
that of Pischke and Velling (1994) to a German regional panel dataset
constructed from the GSOEP and other officially published data. In contrast
to the studies surveyed thus far, he further controls for the state of techno-
logy, measured as the trend in total factor productivity and the stock of
capital in a region. Hatzius (1994) also differentiates between foreign guest-
workers, Aussiedler and Übersiedler, whereas the former studies only con-
sider foreign guestworkers. According to his regression results, immigration
does not seem to affect native unemployment. By contrast, native earnings
are substantially affected. Hatzius' (1994) results imply that foreign guest-
workers have a substantial negative impact on the earnings of natives,
whereas Übersiedler appear to complement natives. Ethnic German immi-
gration from Eastern Europe is unrelated to native earnings (see Table 11).
Bauer (1997) bases his empirical work on the estimation of a flexible
production function, which allows for the calculation of the overall technical
relationship between natives and foreigners, i.e. whether they are substitutes
or complements. He treats foreigners and natives as different production
factors and further differentiates natives and guestworkers according to their
33 hese county data are aggregated by the authors to 166 labour market regions for the years 1985 to
1989. In order to capture the composition of the local labour force, several variables are controlled
for, such as the shares of employment in 12 different industries, the share of highly skilled workers,
the share of unskilled workers, the share of part time workers, the share of female workers, and the
share of workers older than 55. Furthermore, dummies for seven different regions of the country
and the log of the population density in a region are used. Finally, the change in the share of
foreigners in a region is instrumented with its first period level, due to the fact that foreigners may
settle in regions with above-average growing labour markets. This leads to an endogeneity problem
and an upward bias in the wage equation. 58
34 The authors have used three steps to evaluate the factor price elasticities between natives and
immigrants. In the first two steps, they estimate factor price elasticities, differentiating the inputs
of education, low-skilled labor and experience using a translog production function. In the third
step, the authors calculate composite elasticities of complementarity between natives and immi-
grants using the average qualification of both labor groups regarding the three human capital
inputs. 
occupational status and skill, i.e. he uses low skilled blue collar, high skilled
blue collar, and white collar natives and immigrants. The empirical results
summarised in Table 11 show that white collar immigrants are substitutes for
low skilled, blue collar and white collar natives. High skilled blue collar
natives tend to be adversely affected by the increase in the supply of low
skilled blue collar immigrants. Between all other native and foreign groups,
Bauer (1997) reveals a complementary relationship. Since all immigration
wage effects are calculated to be numerically negligible, Bauer (1997)
concludes that fears of negative immigration effects on natives' wages lacks
an empirical basis. He demonstrates a remarkable impact of immigration on
foreign individuals' wages in the German labour market, however. Here, the
elasticities range from a 1.78 percent increase in the wages of white collar
foreign workers (caused by a ten percent increase in the inflow of high
skilled blue collar foreign workers) to a 2.55 percent decrease in the wages
of low skilled blue collar foreign workers (caused by a ten percent increase
in the inflow of low skilled blue collar foreign workers). 
Similar to Bauer's study (1997), Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994a) also
feature the use of production technology to estimate the effects of
immigration on the labour market. In contrast to existing literature, the
authors do not consider immigrants and native-born as separate production
inputs. Rather, Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994a) suggest that the labour market
impact of immigrants is related to the specific skills they bring to the labour
market of the receiving country.34 Based on 6 waves (1986-1989) of the
Eurobarometer, they estimate the technological relationship between natives
and foreigners for four countries: The Netherlands, France, United Kingdom,
and Germany. The results of Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994a) imply slightly
negative effects of immigration on the resident workers in the countries
considered in the analysis. The estimated effects are very different, however,
depending on the specific immigration group they are examining (see Table
11). For example, in The Netherlands a 1% increase of the population would
lower the wages of Dutch workers by 0.09%, if this inflow consisted solely
of Turks but would increase the wages by 0.02% if the migrants came from
Surinam. In France and the United Kingdom, resident workers suffer the
highest wage losses when the migrants come from Asia. A1% increase in the
population of these two countries due to the immigration of Asians would
lead to a 0.11% reduction in the wages of French workers and a wage59
reduction of 0.08% in the United Kingdom. The immigration of Italians to
France has nearly no effect on the wages of natives. In the UK and Germany,
the immigration of Irish workers actually increases the wages of natives. The
wages of German workers are adversely affected by the immigration of
Portuguese migrants. Small substitution effects are found for immigrants
from guestworker recruitment countries (Turkey, Portugal, Spain, and Italy).
Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994a) conclude that native individuals with human
capital endowments divergent from those of  immigrant’s experience wage
increases, while native individuals with human capital endowments similar
to immigrating workers experience wage reductions.
Hunt (1992) uses data on Algerian repatriates in France to study the
labour market effects of immigration. Even though France experienced a
huge inflow (900,000 people or 1.6% of the total French labour force in
1968) of repatriates from Algeria in 1962, the estimates indicate that the
average annual salaries of French workers were lowered, at most, by 1.3%
(this number is based on an estimated elasticity of native wages with regard
to a 1% increase in the share of foreigners). Using an approach similar to
Pischke and Velling (1994), Dolado, Jimeno, and Duce (1996) find small, but
positive, effects of immigration on the wages of Spanish workers (see Table
11). Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996) concentrate on the effects of
immigration on Austrian blue collar workers. In their analysis they find that
wages of natives correlate positively with foreigner shares on a regional,
industry, or even firm level. Using a panel data set on industries, Winter-
Ebmer and Zimmermann (1998) find that wages in Austria would decrease
by 0.16% in response to an immigration of 1% of the Austrian labour force,
whereas German workers seem to be complements to migrants, at least to
those from East Europe.
To summarise this section, most existing empirical studies on the impact
of immigrants on the wages of natives find only negligible negative effects.
In some cases the effects are even positive. Following our analysis in section
2 of this report, one can assume that 3 million people (about 1% of the EU
population 1995) will immigrate from the East within the next 15 years, i.e.
200,000 per year. In the first year after a potential enlargement, this inflow
of 200,000 people would imply that the share of the foreign population in the
EU would increase from 1.86%35 to 1.91% or by 2.69%. The empirical
studies surveyed in this section indicate that an increase in the share of
foreigners decreases the wages of EU-natives in the worst case scenario by
about 0.3%. Based on these numbers, one can calculate that the immigration
of 200,000 East Europeans will decrease the wages of the workers in the
current EU member countries at most by 0.81% of the current wage levels.
Taking the per capita average available yearly income from dependent work60
35 This share is based on numbers from 1993 (see Table 1).
36 After 10 years the calculated wage effect of the immigration of 200,000 East Europeans reduces to
0.64%.
in the EU in 1996 (9,094 ECU) into account, this would be equivalent to an
income reduction of 73,66 ECU in the first year after a possible enlargement.
Note that this number is an upper bound for the wage effects for several
reasons. First, assuming that 200,000 East Europeans immigrate every year
implies that the percentage increase in the foreigner share declines from year
to year, which in turn implies that the calculated wage effect in the first year
represents a maximum.36 Second, the calculated wage effect is the result of
a partial analysis; this ignores effects that lower the potential wage effects of
immigration such as labour supply effects and adjustment effects in the
goods market. Finally, since we expect that most of these migrants will end
up in Germany or Austria, the other current EU member states would
experience a much smaller income reduction.
Several reasons may explain the small wage effects found in the existing
empirical studies. First, binding wage floors (i.e. minimum wages or social
security levels) might prevent natives' wages to fall. In such a case,
immigration would lead to increased unemployment of natives without
affecting their wages. In the next sub-section we will therefore review
empirical studies on the employment effects of immigration. Second,
immigration may induce natives to move out of the areas with a high
percentage of immigrants to areas with a low share of foreigners. This would
results in a decreased supply of native labour in those areas with a high
foreigner share and an increased supply of native labour in regions with a low
foreigner share. Overall, natives’ wages would fall but by far less compared
to a situation in which natives do not move in response to immigration. There
is not much empirical evidence on the influence of the immigration of
foreigners on the migration behaviour of natives. Evidence from the U.S.
(Card, 1990) and France (Hunt, 1992), however, indicate that natives do not
move to a great extend in response to the influx of foreigners.
3.2.2. Employment and Unemployment
The existence of rigid wages may be on reason for the small wage effects
found in the empirical studies in the last section. If wages in European labour
markets are rigid, it might be the case that immigration would actually
increase the unemployment of natives without affecting their wages.
According to the theoretical framework presented above, one might expect
that the higher the substitutability of foreign workers for natives, the more
likely an increase in immigration would lead to an increase in
unemployment, if wages in the destination country are inflexible. Once again61
using the reasonable simplification that skilled and unskilled workers are
complements and that immigrants tend to be substitutes for low-qualified,
native individuals and complements for high-qualified natives, increased
immigration of low-skilled individuals may increase unemployment of low-
skilled workers and may induce the reverse effect for the high-qualified. On
the other hand, assuming that the labour market for high-skilled workers is
flexible, immigration of high-skilled migrants may decrease unemployment
of low-skilled natives without having employment effects on qualified
natives. Similar to the existing studies on the wage effects of immigration,
most European studies analyse the employment effects of immigration using
German data. However, since such empirical studies are much more
heterogeneous in their empirical approach and estimation methods than those
surveyed in the last section, a summary of the results similar to Table 11 is
not feasible.
Afirst attempt at analysing the employment and unemployment effects of
immigration to Germany was made by Winkelmann and Zimmermann
(1993). For the ten-year period 1974-1984, they estimate the effects of
individual characteristics and industry-level variables on labour mobility
measured by the number of job changes and the frequency of unemployment.
Their analysis is based on 1,830 males, of whom 586 are foreigners. Females
are excluded from the analysis in order to avoid having to model family
formation. Immigration is evaluated as an exogenous variable by the share of
foreign labour in 34 industries in 1974.37 The estimation results of
Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) show a significant but small
immigration effect on the unemployment frequency of German workers. In
order to examine the effects of an increased presence of immigrants in the
labour market on the unemployment frequency of domestic workers, they
simulate an increase in the share of foreign labour in all sectors by factors 2
and 4. The results of these simulations indicate that, all other things being
equal, unemployment would rise substantially with immigration. In contrast
to the seventies (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1993), Mühleisen and
Zimmermann (1994) find no evidence that foreign labour induced
unemployment in the eighties.38 Their estimation results show no significant
37 Furthermore, years of schooling, schooling squared, dummies for family status, membership in a
trade union, and the occupational status of the worker's first job (using the categories ordinary blue,
qualified blue, ordinary white, and qualified white collar workers) are specified as control
variables. Differences in the sectoral employment trends are captured by a variable measuring the
growth of employment between 1974 and 1984.
38 Their empirical application is based on a sub-sample of 1982 male individuals of the German
Socio-Economic Panel, who were at least 19 in 1984 and at most 59 years old in 1989, and were
not self-employed, in education, or a civil servant. Transitions between states of employment and
unemployment are modelled as outcomes of binomial probit processes, where standard demo-
graphic variables like age, nationality, physical condition, years of schooling, job status, and
previous employment or unemployment are contained.62
indication that a larger share of foreigners in the labour force of specific
industries causes unemployment.
Pischke and Velling (1994) offer two different ways to analyse the
employment and unemployment effects of immigration. The first model
follows their approach outlined in section 3.2.1. According to this approach,
increased immigration yields small but insignificant negative effects on
employment, while simultaneously yielding a large and significant positive
effect on unemployment. There is some evidence, however, for a spurious
effect in these estimation results, because the immigrant's impact on
unemployment is not fully reflected in reduced employment. Pischke and
Velling (1994) calculate that a one percent increase in the share of foreigners
should increase the unemployment rate by two percent, which means that
430,000 additional foreigners would cause 500,000 additional unemployed
individuals. Applying a similar approach, Hatzius (1994), whose analysis
was discussed in the previous section, could not find statistically significant
effects of immigration on native unemployment.
In their second model, Pischke and Velling (1994) analyse flow data for
migration between labour market regions between the years 1986 and 1988.
They examine the impact of foreign net-migration on employment and
unemployment, distinguishing whether a foreign individual migrates from
abroad or from another labour market region within Germany. For the years
1986 to 1987, the estimated coefficients on the foreigner-share variable in the
employment and unemployment equation switch signs and tend to be
insignificant. Apart from a significantly negative effect of gross foreign
inflow from Germany in 1986, the coefficients on gross foreign inflow from
abroad and gross foreign inflow from Germany are small and insignificant
for the analysed period. To sum up the results of Pischke and Velling (1994),
the impact of immigration on employment and unemployment in the 1980's
are in line with the findings of Mühleisen and Zimmermann (1994), who also
find no significant negative effects of immigration on unemployment. One
has to keep in mind that both studies examine the impacts of immigration
during a boom period in Germany, so an analysis of periods of recession
would be a topic for future research.
Velling (1995) examines the impact of immigration on regional
unemployment rates. Like Pischke and Velling (1994), he employs a data set
from the Federal Research Institute for Regional Geography and Regional
Planning and supplements it with data from the German Federal Labour
Office. This results in a data set with longitudinal character, thus allowing for
a deeper analysis of the native labour market consequences of immigration.
Velling (1995) distinguishes between regional employment effects caused by
immigration of Germans (including ethnic Germans), immigration of63
individuals with EU nationality, and immigration of other foreign
individuals. Furthermore, he separates the employment effects of increased
immigration by seasonal workers or contract workers. According to the
estimated results, a one percent increase in total immigration causes a 0.24
percent increase in average regional unemployment in Germany between
1988 and 1993, while a one percent increase in the inflow of Germans causes
an increase in the average regional unemployment rate of 0.19 percent. The
inflow of EU foreign workers or foreign workers with other nationalities
causes unemployment effects smaller than 0.05 percent. These small effects
are especially remarkable in the face of the large net inflow of foreigners and
ethnic Germans to Germany in the years after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The
employment effects of immigration defined by work permit workers
(seasonal workers, contract workers) are even smaller and tend to be
insignificant. Differentiating the effects of immigration on low qualified and
high qualified labour yields larger effects of immigration on the employment
of low-qualified workers when compared to high-qualified workers.
Separating migrants into low-qualified and high-qualified individuals results
in the expected complementarity of both groups of workers. That is, the
inflow of low-qualified workers results in an increase in the unemployment
of domestic low-qualified workers and a decrease in the unemployment of
high-qualified workers and vice versa in the case of an inflow of high-
qualified workers. Velling’s (1995) results on the small employment effects
of immigration are in line with other contributions. As with all other
microeconometric examinations of the consequences of immigration on the
native labour market, the datasets used only allow for the analysis of a rather
short period of time.
Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994b) utilise the West German subsample of the
October/November 1988 Eurobarometer survey in order to study the
influence of guestworkers on the employment probabilities of natives. They
estimate the likelihood that a German resident will be employed relative to
being unemployed on the share of foreigners in a region. To capture foreign
presence, the authors use two different measures. The first is defined as the
percentage of the foreign population in the Bundesländer; the second is based
on the respondent’s self-reported presence of foreigners in their
neighbourhood. The results of Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994b) show that
there is no statistically significant effect on the employment probabilities of
natives based on the share of foreigners in a Bundesland. Using the self-
reported measure of foreign presence, they find that people living in
neighbourhoods with many foreigners are more likely to be unemployed. The
latter results can be interpreted in various ways: either unemployed natives
misperceive the number of foreigners in their neighbourhood; hey live in64
neighbourhoods with more foreigners; or the more localised, self-reported
measure of foreigner presence captures the labour market effects better than
the more aggregated share of foreigners in a Bundesland.
Compared to the existing empirical evidence on Germany, studies on the
employment effects of immigration in other EU member states are rather
scarce. In an econometric study using individual data for Austrian workers,
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1997) conclude that increased immigration
does not result in higher unemployment of Austrian manufacturing workers,
although it does increase the duration of unemployment: an increase in the
immigration share by 1 percentage point increases unemployment duration
by approximately 5%, i.e. 5 days. Using industry data Winter-Ebmer and
Zimmermann (1998) find that immigration to Austria has negative
employment effects on natives, i.e. a 1 percentage point increase in the
foreigner share in an industry decreases native employment growth by
0.13%. For Germany, they find that the overall foreigner share in an industry
has a slightly negative effect on native employment growth. However, they
also show that the share of foreigners from Eastern Europe fosters native
employment growth. For Spain, Dolado, Jimeno, and Duce (1996) find little
evidence that the inflow of immigrants is associated with negative effects on
the employment of less-skilled natives. Estimates for France indicate that the
inflow of Algerian repatriates in 1962 increased the 1968 unemployment of
non-repatriates by 0.3 percentage points at most (Hunt, 1992).
To summarise, even though the empirical evidence on the employment
effects of immigration is more contradictory than those on wages, the bulk of
the evidence indicates that the employment effects of immigration in Europe
are very small. Using the results of Hunt (1992) as an upper benchmark, an
1 % increase in the share of foreign workers in the EU increase the
unemployment rate in Europe by approximately 0.2 percentage points. As in
section 3.2.1., one can assume that immigration from Eastern Europe will
increase the proportion of the Non-EU population in the first year after a
potential enlargement from 1.86% to 1.91% or by 2.69%. From these
numbers one can calculate that the expected immigration from Eastern
Europe will increase the EU unemployment rate by 0.54 percentage points.
In addition to the reasons already given in section 3.2.1., there are further
arguments indicating that this number represents an upper bound of the
employment effects of immigration. First, as Hunt (1992) notes, her
estimates of the unemployment elasticity of immigration is biased upwards,
because there is evidence that this number is also picking up some business
cycle effects. Second, as we know from the discussion in section 2 of this
report, most potential migrants from the East intend to migrate only
temporary, which would mean that the numbers reported above are too high.65
3.3.  Simulating the potential effects of future East-West migration
In this section we evaluate the benefits of immigration using a simulation
approach for the EU as a whole as well as for Germany and the UK.  In the
following simulations, we draw upon the theoretical models outlined in
section 3.1. of this report. At first, a simple equilibrium model with full
employment is used. This model is described in more detail in Appendix D
and follows closely the work of Borjas (1995). In the second step, the
calculations are then modified to deal with a situation, in which the market
for unskilled labour is in disequilibrium, i.e. where the labour market is
characterised by the unemployment of unskilled workers. Due to a lack of
data, however, our calibration exercise cannot differentiate between skilled
and unskilled labour but only between manual and non-manual work in the
EU. Note that manual and non-manual work is only a rough approximation
for skilled and unskilled labour, since in principle, both types of workers
could be distinguished as skilled and unskilled. Instead of assuming
unemployment of unskilled labour, we assume that unemployment occurs
only in the manual sector. The calibration is based on 1993 EU data; for
Germany and the UK, the data used for the simulations refer to 1996. The
data sources and the assumptions underlying our simulations are reported at
the bottom of Table 12. As a point of reference, we follow Borjas (1995) and
calculate the gains of natives from immigration in a situation where all
labour markets are in equilibrium, i.e. where the economy is characterised by
full employment. For simplicity of calculation, we assume that during the
year after enlargement, immigration is 1% of the 1993 European
employment, which implies 1.477 million new workers. 
Table 12 contains the calculated gains from immigration using two
models: the simple equilibrium model with full employment and the
disequilibrium model for different compositions of immigration. As a first
point of reference, we will discuss the simple equilibrium model. Figure 12
demonstrates how these gains are calculated: if only unskilled migrants are
accepted, the total benefit of immigration is given by the sum of the areas A,
B and C; area B is allocated to immigrants, areas Aand C to natives. It should
be noted, that the benefits of immigrants refer only to their income in the
receiving country. To calculate the net benefits of migration for the migrants,
their forgone earnings in the sending country and the migration costs have to
be subtracted from the numbers calculated in this study. As Table 12
indicates, if only manual workers immigrate and if the size of the
immigration reaches 1 % of the native work force in one year, the natives'
39 See Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) for a detailed description of this approach.66
total gain is calculated to be 0.322 billion ECU or 0.01% of the European
GDP in 1993. The respective values for the UK and Germany are 0.063 and
0.114 billion ECU. Minimum gains in the EU are approximately 0.055
billion ECU, if 59% of the immigrants are non-manual workers. If, however,
non-manual or skilled workers immigrate, the gains of the natives reach
0.181 billion ECU or 0.003% of the European GDP in 1993, 0.015 billion
ECU (0.01% of the GDP) in the UK, and 0.032 billion ECU (0.01% of the
GDP) in Germany  (see Table 12 and Figure 12). In the case of skilled
immigration, the gains of natives in Figure 12 are the areas E and F; the
income of immigrants is I. Acomparison of these numbers with the simulated
gains from immigration in the United States implies that the gains are
substantially smaller in the EU, if we assume equilibrium (Borjas, 1995).
Note further that these findings are stable with respect to major changes in
the assumed elasticities.  
Figure 13 also shows the distributional effects of immigration in the
equilibrium model for the EU. These effects could be quite dramatic. It
appears that capital always benefits from immigration, and that these benefits
increase with the share of non-manual immigrants. If skilled immigration of
1% of the total native labour force occurs, the gains of capital reaches 11.545
billion ECU or 0.22% of EU GDP in 1993. Non-manual, native workers
show a positive immigration gain as long as no more than 40% of the
immigrants are manual; manual native workers benefit from immigration, if
more than 71% of the immigrants are non-manual. Both types of labour
could lose much through immigration, depending on the share of immigrants
who substitute them (see Table 12 and Figure 13). For instance, if 1% of the
native work force immigrates in one year and all immigrants are non-manual,
non-manual native workers would lose 0.9% of their initial income. The
maximum loss of manual native workers is calculated to reach 25.042 billion
ECU or 1.8% of their initial income, in the case of manual immigration.
40 See Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) for a sensitivity analysis.67
Figure 12:
Calculating the labour market effects of immigration:
equilibrium model
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Simulated long-run labour market effects of EU enlargement towards
Central and Eastern Europe in billions of ECU (% of GDP) due to
immigration of 1% of the EU population in the year after enlargement
Nativ      Immigrants                Total
1. EUROPE
A. Immigration of manual workers
(I) Equilibrium    0.322    33.816       34.138      
(0.01) (0.64) (0.64)
(II) Disequilibrium
a) Constant native unemployment     0.322    33.816    34.138    
(0.01) (0.64) (0.64)
b) Immigration equals increase in native  -34.461               34.461 0.000
unemployment (-0.65) (0.65) (0.00)
B. Immigration of non-manual workers
(I) Equilibrium 0.181 39.628 39.810
(0.003) (0.74) (0.75)
(II) Disequilibrium
a) Constant native unemployment 0.181 39.628 39.810
(0.003) (0.74) (0.75)
b) Zero native unemployment 367.092 39.628 406.720
(6.90) (0.74) (7.64)
2. UK
A. Immigration of unskilled workers
(I) Equilibrium 0.063 2.568 2.631
(0.01) (0.32) (0.33)
(II) Disequilibrium
a)  Constant native unemployment 0.063  2.568 2.631
(0.01) (0.32) (0.33)
b) Immigration equals increase in native  -2.027 2.027  0.000
unemployment
(-0.26) (0.26) (0.00)
B. Immigration of skilled workers
(I) Equilibrium 0.015 5.456 5.471 
(0.002) (0.69) (0.69)
(II) Disequilibrium
a) Constant native unemployment 0.015 5.456 5.471
(0.002) (0.69) (0.69)




A. Immigration of unskilled workers
(I) Equilibrium 0.114(0.01) 6.958 7.072
(0,01) (0.50) (0.51)
(II) Disequilibrium
a) Constant native unemployment 0.114 6.958 7.072
(0.01) (0.50) (0.51)
b) Immigration equals increase in native  -8.975 8.975 0.000
unemployment    (-0.65) (0.65) (0.00)
B. Immigration of skilled workers
(I) Equilibrium 0.032 10.622 10.654
(0.002) (0.76) (0.77)
(II) Disequilibrium
a) Constant native unemployment 0.032 10.622 10.654
(0.002) (0.76) (0.77)




The data refer to the EU in 1993. GDP equals 5.323 trillion ECU; the share of national income accruing
to manual workers is 25.7%, that of non-manual workers 45.3%, and that of capital 29%. The income
shares are assumed to remain unchanged during immigration. The elasticity of factor price for manual
workers is -0.743, that for non-manual workers is -0.547. The elasticity of the wage of manual workers
with respect to a change in non-manual workers is 0.257, that of non-manual workers with respect to a
change in manual workers is 0.453. Furthermore, 60.3% of the native labour force is non-manual; 39.7%
is manual. Figures within parentheses refer to the share of gains/losses from immigration in GDP of the
EU in 1993. 
Sources:
EUROSTAT (1993), Europäische Kommission (1994); ILO (1994), Statistisches Bundesamt (1993b,
1994).
2. UK:
The data refer to the UK in 1996. GDPequals 792.296 billion ECU; the share of national income accruing
to unskilled workers is 6.8%, that of skilled workers 55.4%, and that of capital 37.8%. The income shares
are assumed to remain unchanged during immigration. The elasticity of factor price for unskilled workers
is -0.932, that for skilled workers is -0.446. The elasticity of the wage of skilled workers with respect to
a change in unskilled workers is 0.068, that of unskilled workers with respect to a change in skilled
workers is 0.554. Furthermore, 80% of the native labour force is skilled; 20% is unskilled. Figures within
parentheses refer to the share of gains/losses from immigration in GDP of the UK in 1996. 
Sources:
Labour Force Survey (Spring 1996), Government Statistical Service (1999).
Germany:
The data refer to Germany in 1996. GDPequals 1.391 trillion ECU; the share of national income accruing
to unskilled workers is 14%, that of skilled workers 56%, and that of capital 30%. The income shares are
assumed to remain unchanged during immigration. The elasticity of factor price for manual workers is -
0.860, that for skilled workers is -0.440. The elasticity of the wage of skilled workers with respect to a
change in unskilled workers is 0.140, that of unskilled workers with respect to a change in skilled workers
is 0.560. Furthermore, 72.9% of the native labour force is skilled; 27.1% is unskilled. Figures within
parentheses refer to the share of gains/losses from immigration in GDP of Germany in 1996. 
Sources:
EUROSTAT (1999), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998), Sachverständigenrat (1998).70
Figure 13: 
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Table 12 also examines the change in calculated immigration gains, if
unemployment of manual natives and the various union reactions to
immigration are taken into consideration.41 First, we consider a case in
which 1% of the native work force immigrates in one year and all
immigrants are manual workers. If the union lowers the wage of manual
workers such that native unemployment remains constant, the immigration
gain is the sum of areas A, B, and C in Figure 14 (scenario A II a in Table
12). The immigration benefits in this situation are the same as in the full
employment model. Scenario A II b in Table 12 represents a situation in
which the union keeps the wages of unskilled labour fixed and immigration
leads to an equal increase in native unemployment. Hence, natives lose area
D in Figure 14 or 34.461 billion ECU, if one considers the EU (calculated
41 Appendix B gives the exact formulas for the calculations.71
as w0 multiplied by the number of immigrants), which equals the income of
the immigrants. In this case, UK natives lose 2.027 billion ECU (0.26% of
the GDP), while German natives lose 8.975 billion ECU (0.65% of the
GDP). In this extreme scenario, the total immigration gain is zero and the
losses of natives are maximised. A more realistic scenario is a partial
crowding-out of manual native workers. However, for the calculation of the
gains and losses in such a scenario, further assumptions are necessary. As
Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) show, the gains and losses in this scenario
depend on the importance of manual employment in the objective function
of the union. Calibrating the model for this intermediate scenario leads to
gains and losses which are somewhere in-between the two extreme cases
outlined above . Table 12 also examines the change in calculated
immigration gains, if unemployment of manual natives and the various union
reactions to immigration are taken into consideration. First, we consider a
case in which 1% of the native work force immigrates in one year and all
immigrants are manual workers. If the union lowers the wage of manual
workers such that native unemployment remains constant, the immigration
gain is the sum of areas A, B, and C in Figure 14 (scenario A II a in Table
12). The immigration benefits in this situation are the same as in the full
employment model. Scenario A II b in Table 12 represents a situation in
which the union keeps the wages of unskilled labour fixed and immigration
leads to an equal increase in native unemployment. Hence, natives lose area
D in Figure 14 or 34.461 billion ECU, if one considers the EU (calculated as
w0 multiplied by the number of immigrants), which equals the income of the
immigrants. In this case, UK natives lose 2.027 billion ECU (0.26% of the
GDP), while German natives lose 8.975 billion ECU (0.65% of the GDP). In
this extreme scenario, the total immigration gain is zero and the losses of
natives are maximised. A more realistic scenario is a partial crowding-out of
manual native workers. However, for the calculation of the gains and losses
in such a scenario, further assumptions are necessary. As Bauer and
Zimmermann (1997) show, the gains and losses in this scenario depend on
the importance of manual employment in the objective function of the union.
Calibrating the model for this intermediate scenario leads to gains and losses
which are somewhere in-between the two extreme cases outlined above .
If only skilled immigration is considered, the union also has several
possibilities to react to the resulting increased demand for unskilled workers.
One extreme reaction is described by Scenario B II, where the union
increases the wage in such a way that native unemployment remains
constant. Figure 14 reveals that, in this case, the gains of the natives remain
the same as in the full employment model (sum of area E and F). The other
extreme case (scenario B II b in Table 12) is caused by a wage reduction,72
42 In Germany´s case, Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) show that these tax and social security
contributions can be quite substantial.
43 See Riphahn (1998) for an analysis of immigrant participation in social assistance programs in
Germany.
resulting in zero unemployment. In this case, the natives´ gains from
immigration are calculated as the sum of the immigration gain, if only skilled
persons immigrate (areas E and F in Figure 14) plus the total immigration
gain, if only unskilled immigration, equal to the number of unemployed
natives, occurs (areas G and H in Figure 14). This case, which describes the
maximum benefit from immigration for natives and in total, is estimated to
result in a total immigration gain for the EU of 406.720 billion ECU (7.6%
of the GDP) of which 367.092 billion ECU (6.90% of the GDP) is received
by natives. In the UK the total gain would be 9.661 billion ECU (1.22% of
the GDP) of which 4.205 billion ECU (0.53% of the GDP) would be received
by natives. The respective numbers for Germany are 28.814 billion ECU
(2.07% of GDP) for the total gain and 19.192 billion ECU (1.38% of the
GDP) as gain for natives.
Due to various reasons, the losses from immigration calculated above
could be seen as an upper bound and the gains as a lower bound. First, the
calculations neglect the taxes and social security contributions paid by
immigrants.42 In general, immigrants are relatively young in comparison to
the native population. It could, therefore, be expected that tax and social
security contributions would increase the gains of natives..43 Second, the
above calculations neglect the indirect labour market effects, which result
from an increased labour demand due to the consumption of immigrants. As
we have outlined in section 3.1 of this report (see also Figure 10), these
indirect labour market effects increase the gains that natives can expect from
immigration.73
Figure 14: 
Calculating the labour market effects of immigration: 
disequilibrium model
A. Immigration of unskilled worker
B. Immigration of skilled worker
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In this section we analysed the potential labour market effects of future East-
West migration. From economic theory it is not clear whether natives of the
receiving countries, on the whole, benefit or suffer from the immigration of
workers. It is clear, however, that those natives who are in direct competition
with the migrants in the labour market will suffer through lower wages
and/or lower employment prospects, whereas those natives who are
complements to the migrants will benefit from additional immigration. The
owners of capital will always gain through immigration. Most existing
empirical studies on the wage and employment effects of immigration find
only negligible effects. Assuming a yearly immigration of 200,000 people
from Eastern Europe, the wages of EU-natives will decrease in the first year
after a potential enlargement at most by 0.81% of the current wage levels.
Empirical studies on employment effects indicate that a similar immigration
flow will result in an increase of EU unemployment in the first year after a
potential enlargement by approximately 0.54 percentage points. In both cases
these numbers represent an upper bound.
Simulating an economic model of the labour market effects of
immigration after a potential enlargement, based on data for the EU, the UK,
and Germany, show that, in the worst case scenario, immigration of unskilled
workers of 1% of the current EU population in one year would imply losses
of about 34 billion ECU or about 0.7% of the EU GDP in 1993. For the UK
this number is simulated to reach 2 billion ECU (0.26% of the UK GDP in
1996); for Germany, the maximum loss is simulated to reach about 9 billion
ECU (0.65% of the German GDPin 1996). It is further simulated that the EU
on the whole as well as the UK and Germany will benefit from the
immigration of skilled workers. The simulation further reveals that
immigration always has substantial effects on income distribution.75
44 A general analysis of migration policy issues is given by Straubhaar and Zimmermann (1993) and
Zimmermann (1994). See Zimmermann (1994, 1995a, 1995b) for a comprehensive discussion of
the immigration policies of the EU and its single members.
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
4.1. The need for a common EU immigration policy
The need for a common EU migration policy is connected with the
characteristics of a common European market, since the abolition of interior
borders results in a dependency of each member state on the immigration
policy of the other states. Once a foreigner enters EU-territory, the further
migration of this person can no longer be controlled. As a result of free
labour and product markets within the EU, individual member countries are
unable to follow independent migration policies without potentially harming
other members. Therefore, the EU should consider a unified migration
policy.44 An unified immigration policy is, however, just in the infancy
stages. Since 1988, the EU’s migration policy is marked by two different
developments. First, since the original Treaty of Rome in 1957, internal
migration within the EU has been steadily liberalised, concluding in Article
8a of the Single European Act. This Act requires the achievement of the free
movement of people, capital, goods, and services by 1 January, 1993,
implying the abolishment of controls on the interior borders of the EU. 
Second, with respect to immigration from outside the EU, there have been
increasing efforts to establish a unified and more restrictive policy. A
development towards a joint EU migration policy started with the Schengen
Accords of  June 1985 (Schengen I), 19 June, 1990 (Schengen II), and the
accord of Dublin on 15 June, 1990, continuing with the Maastricht Treaty of
1992. The main objectives of these initiatives are as follows: to eliminate
internal border checks, to establish consistent and tighter external border
controls, a unified visa policy, and the co-ordination of different national
asylum policies. For the time being, the final step can be seen in the Treaties
of Amsterdam in 1997. Concerning migration policy, Article 63 of this treaty
declares closer co-operation in the fight against illegal migrants, the
elaboration of joint norms regarding the acceptance of asylum seekers, the
prerequisites for immigration and residence of immigrants from countries
outside the EU, and the rights and conditions under which immigrants of one
EU member country can reside in another member country. The Amsterdam
Treaty explicitly states that there is no specific time schedule for the
resolutions regarding these measures for a joint migration policy.
In general, there are two options for the migration policy of the current
EU member countries towards the potential future members in Central and76
Eastern Europe. First, a laissez-faire system in which the migration of labour
from the new member countries to the old member countries is unrestricted.
According to Article 8a of the Single European Act, this policy seems to be
unavoidable in the long-run. Second, the current EU member countries could
decide to restrict free labour mobility from the East to the West temporarily,
as was the case when Spain and Portugal became members of the EU. In the
following section, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both
strategies.
What are the options for a unified EU immigration policy? It is sometimes
argued that free trade and free capital mobility could replace free labour
mobility. A substantial part of the goods and services produced are
nontradeable, however. In addition, competition from imports produced by
cheap labour abroad may crowd out native workers and result in the loss of
market sectors by the importing country. Foreign investment may have
similar effects, and those, too, may be lasting. A further argument is that
immigration pressure arising from differences in economic development
could be best moderated by rapid economic growth in the countries of
emigration. The implication here is that the current EU member countries
could mitigate immigration from Central and Eastern Europe by larger
transfers to these countries. The available evidence from developing
countries suggests, however, that a faster rate of development destabilises the
economic system at first and then creates new incentives for out-migration,
at least in the short-run.  
4.2.  Options for a unified EU migration policy towards Central and
Eastern European countries
Article 8a of the Single European Act requires free mobility of people,
goods, and services. After a possible enlargement of the EU towards Central
and Eastern European countries, these rights cannot be restricted for these
countries in the long-run. However, as was the case when Spain and Portugal
became members of the EU, it might be possible to restrict the free mobility
of labour from the new to the old member countries during an adjustment
period. If the membership of the Central and Eastern European countries is
connected to a temporary restriction of migration, the question arises whether
the current EU member countries should establish a selective immigration
policy towards the East, and how such a selective policy should be organised.
In the following section we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both
migration policy options, i.e. a laissez-faire system and a temporary and
selective immigration policy. 77
4.2.1. Free labour mobility
Cost benefit considerations are at the centre of the economic analysis of
immigration. In principle, a country should allow immigration, if the
marginal productivity of the immigrants for the receiving country is higher
than their marginal costs of integration. In a scenario of free labour mobility
after a possible enlargement of the EU, the labour market would decide to
what extent people immigrate. The free market would determine size and
composition of the immigration flows. Employment possibilities and (real)
wage reactions in the labour market alone would limit the demand for foreign
labour, and, consequently, the attractiveness of immigration.
The discussion of the theoretical models in section 3.1. of this report has
shown that the higher the ability to substitute foreign for domestic workers,
the more severe the threat from immigration becomes. Difficulties tend to
arise when an increase in immigration causes a decline in the wages of the
domestic labour force or, if their wages are inflexible, an increase in
domestic unemployment. Immigrants, however, often complement native
workers in production, thereby increasing their productivity and their wages.
Foreigners also create the ability to provide different products in the service
sector. Furthermore, immigrants create demands for goods and services
produced by natives and, thus, have multiplier effects. Section 3.2 of this
report has shown that most empirical studies on the labour market effects of
immigration find only negligible negative wage and employment effects of
immigration, and they often confirm that immigration is mostly beneficial for
the receiving countries. 
Most of the studies in section 3 of this report, however, neglect the cost side
of immigration. The benefits of migration can only be reaped, if the resulting
adjustment costs are kept under control. Immigrants use public goods and,
therefore, might have adverse effects on the consumption possibilities of
public goods for natives. Immigrants have to adjust to the rules and habits of
the receiving country's society; this adjustment process could be very costly.
Finally, the theoretical models in section 3.1. and the simulations in section
3.3. of this report have shown that immigration may have large effects on the
distribution of income. This redistribution of income, itself, may cause social
frictions which have to be taken into consideration in the cost-benefit
analysis of immigration. In principle, countries that expect substantial
immigration costs can offset them by imposing entrance fees and migration
taxes. Such entrance fees and migration taxes can also be used to control and
smooth immigration flows. However, due to the requirements defined in
Article 8a of the Single European Act such fees and taxes may not be
applicable for intra-EU migration and, therefore, in the case of a possible
enlargement of the EU, could only be used in the short-run. 78
4.2.2. Temporary selective migration policy
In a system of free labour mobility, the receiving country cannot control the
composition of immigration. The discussion in section 3 of this report has
shown that even though immigration from the Central and Eastern European
countries is expected to have, at most, small negative effects on native
workers, there is a high potential for large effects on the income distribution,
possibly causing social frictions in the native population. The theoretical and
empirical analysis in the last section has also shown that immigration could
have positive effects on the wages and employment of native workers, if the
receiving country could select those immigrants who are complements to
domestic workers. Such a selective immigration policy could prevent income
inequality from rising. Furthermore, given the need to survive in highly
competitive international markets with highly innovative activity,
industrialised countries may be tempted to consider a selective immigration
policy, in order to attract workers with high qualifications needed in their
industries. So far this has not been the case in Europe. Employment of
foreigners in the EU is relatively weak in export-oriented, research-intensive
industries. Foreigners are more attracted to industries that face strong import
competition and employ lower qualified workers 45. It must be stressed that a
selective immigration policy towards potential new EU members could only
be a temporary option for a strictly limited period of time. As in the case of
entrance fees and migration taxes, a selective immigration policy is not in
line with Article 8a of the Single European Act and, therefore, could be only
imposed for an adjustment period such as in the case of the membership
procedure of Spain and Portugal.
The discussion in section 3 of this report indicates that a selective EU
immigration policy towards new members should restrict the immigration of
unskilled workers and promote the immigration of skilled workers. This
policy would lead to an increased supply of skilled workers, lowering the
wages for this type of worker and decreasing the excess demand for skilled
workers. If unskilled and skilled workers complement each other, the
increased employment of skilled workers would increase the demand for
unskilled workers, increasing the wages of the latter, or, in more rigid labour
markets, decreasing their unemployment. 
Two main questions remain with regard to a selective immigration policy.
The first question is whether the receiving country should allow permanent
or only temporary migration. Permanent migration normally implies that
selected high-skill workers will immigrate together with their family.
However, empirical evidence suggests that the family members may end up
45 See Straubhaar and Zimmermann (1993) and Zimmermann (1995a, 1995b) for a discussion of the
composition of immigrants in Europe.79
as unskilled workers, resulting in similar problems as an unregulated
immigration regime. This problem could be avoided by allowing only
temporary migration, since a government could then restrict the immigration
of family members more easily.
Second, how should a selective migration policy be organised? In general,
there are several possibilities.46 The first possibility would be to adapt a
point system, similar to those in Canada, Australia, and, more recently, in
Switzerland.47 Borjas (1991) shows that from1960 to 1980 the Canadian
point system was more successful in selecting better qualified workers, i.e.
more immigrants from Europe, than the USA. The main deficiencies of this
type of policy are: 
(i) the existing management techniques of a point system are not able
to address unexpected events, like recessions; 
(ii)  the time lag between collecting and analysing labour market data on
occupational shortages and the actual landing of immigrants could
lead to the selection of the wrong migrants;
(iii) there are no reliable empirical techniques to identify shortages in
particular occupations; 
and
(iv)  it is difficult to control the immigration of close relatives of previous
immigrants.
Furthermore, the costs of implementing a point system and the administrative
expenses are relatively high when compared to other policy options. Since a
selective immigration policy towards new EU members could be only
temporary, these costs are probably too high to justify a point system.
An alternative policy option would be to follow the immigration policy of
Germany and Austria towards the East, described extensively in section 2.1.
of this report, by signing bilateral agreements with the new EU member
countries which regulate temporary migration under different programs.
Such a policy would have several advantages. First, compared to a point
system, the implementation and administrative expenses are relatively low.
Second, by carefully defining the programs, it could be guaranteed that
mostly skilled workers would temporarily migrate to the current EU member
countries. Third, the quotas defined in such bilateral agreement could be
flexibly defined, as in the case of Germany, and be adapted to the respective
labour market situation in the EU. This policy, however, also suffers from the
deficiencies (i)-(iii) mentioned above for the point system. 
The third possibility is to auction the right to immigrate to potential
46 See Bauer (1998) and Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) for a detailed discussion.
47 See Bauer (1998), Rivera-Batiz, Sechzer, and Gang (1991), Borjas (1991), Abowd and Freeman
(1991), and Weber (1987) for a discussion of the migration policy in the U.S., Canada, and Australia.80
migrants or native firms. To economists, this idea is quite appealing, for an
auction selects migrants according to their ability and willingness to pay.
This selection mechanism would efficiently identify those migrants who
have a large capacity to produce goods of high economic value while
working in the receiving country. While a point system also discriminates
among migrants by their economic value, auctions will, in addition, self-
select those persons who have the best chance to be economically successful.
In general, this holds true, irrespective of whether the immigration visas are
auctioned to potential migrants or to native firms. 
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) have shown that, in the case of temporary
migration, the most efficient immigration policy, in terms of selecting those
immigrants who are of the highest economic value for the receiving country,
is an auction of immigration visas to native firms. In such an auction, the EU
would announce a quota for the total number of entry permissions from the
new EU member countries every year. The immigration visas are only
temporary. In this auction, such temporary immigration visas are given to
those native firms who are willing to pay the highest price for the visas. The
firms then select what type of migrants they, themselves, will employ. If the
firms are required to pay migrants the same wage as they would pay a
domestic worker, this system guarantees that the firms will employ
foreigners only for occupations and tasks, for which they can not find
domestic workers. 
The main advantage of the auction system is that it does not suffer from
the deficiencies of the point system and the bilateral agreements. Compared
to other options of a selective immigration policy, the auction system is
relatively inexpensive, and the costs pay their way through the receipts of the
auction. If the receipts are higher than the costs, the surplus might be used to
compensate those domestic workers who potentially suffer from
immigration. 
4.3. Summary
To summarise, the discussion in this section has shown that the EU has
several options regarding migration policy towards the East only in the short-
run, since, according to Article 8a of the Single European Act, a system of
free mobility seems to be unavoidable. However, as in the past, migration
restrictions could be implemented in the short-run. The analysis in section 3
of this report has shown that, in such a restricted migration regime, the EU
should opt for a selective migration policy in order to avoid potential burdens
for their native population. The discussion of different selective immigration81
policies has shown that an auction system is superior to all other policy
options. In the case of a potential EU enlargement, bilateral agreements
regulating the temporary immigration from the new member countries are
the second-best option. 82
5. CONCLUSION
This report has studied different perspectives and labour market implications
of East-West migration following a possible enlargement of the EU towards
Central and Eastern European countries. Western Europe, especially
Germany, has seen a significant inflow of migrants in the last few decades.
The analysis of the economic and demographic situation in the EU and the
countries applying for membership indicates that further migration is largely
unavoidable. Relying on the phenomenon of network migration, most of the
migration pressure is expected to be directed to countries such as Germany
and Austria. As a rule of thumb, it can be expected that about 2-3% of the
population of the countries seeking EU membership will migrate within the
next 10-15 years. This would imply an immigration flow of about 3 million
people or 0.81% of the EU population in 1995. In other words, after a
possible enlargement, the current EU countries should expect about 200,000
migrants or 0.05% of the EU population per year. Given that yearly
immigration to Germany in the last decade has always been around 1%, this
number seems to be negligible.
The issue, however, is whether immigration in the face of unemployment
automatically causes problems for the labour market of the receiving
countries. The conclusion of our analysis here is that this is not the case.
Using the results of existing empirical studies on the labour market effects of
immigration, a yearly inflow of 200,000 migrants will decrease the wages of
the workers in the current EU member countries at most by 0.81% in current
wage levels in the first year or by approximately 74 ECU. This effect
decreases in subsequent years. Regarding unemployment, the results of
existing empirical studies imply that a similar immigration flow will result in
an increase of the EU unemployment in the first year after a potential
enlargement by about 0.54 percentage points. Note that both the wage effect
and the employment effect represent an upper bound. Simulating an
economic model of the labour market effects of immigration after a potential
enlargement based on data for the EU shows that, in the worst case scenario,
immigration of 1% of the EU population in one year would imply income
losses for the EU member countries of about 34.461 billion ECU or about
0.7% of the EU GDP in 1993. This case would take place in a scenario of
rigid wages and the immigration of exclusively unskilled workers. In a
scenario, in which mainly skilled workers immigrate, one could even expect
gains from immigration. A 1% increase of the EU labour force in one year
due to the immigration of skilled workers can be expected to increase the
income of natives by about 367.092 billion ECU or about 6.9% of EU GDP
in 1993. Simulations also show that immigration always has large effects on
the income distribution in the receiving country. 83
Only in the long-run does the EU have several options regarding
migration policy towards its potential new members. With regard to Article
8a of the Single European Act, a laissez-faire system of unrestricted labour
mobility between the old and the new member countries seems to be
unavoidable. However, as in the case when Spain and Portugal became
members of the EU, a temporary migration restriction for countries seeking
EU membership may be a realistic option. Even in this case, skilled
immigration seems to be a valuable option. If unskilled and skilled workers
are complements in production, substantial gains may be reaped through the
improvement of the employment possibilities of unskilled native workers.
This result, combined with the current excess supply of qualified workers in
Eastern Europe and the need for further improvements in their own human
capital in the process of transformation, suggests that a temporary, selective
immigration policy towards the new member countries should be taken into
consideration. There are several possibilities to organise such a selective
immigration policy. A discussion of the options reveals that a point system
such as that used in Canada or Australia is impracticable. From an economic
point of view, an auction system, in which temporary immigration visas are
auctioned to native firms, is superior to all other policy options. An
alternative could be a selective temporary immigration policy based on
bilateral agreements as executed currently by the German government.REFERENCES:
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APPENDIX A
Survey
"Assessment of possible migration pressure following EU enlargement
to Central and Eastern Europe"
We are undertaking this survey in order to collect the opinions and
assessment of scientists regarding the effects of a more liberal migration
policy by the current EU member countries to the potential future EU-
member countries on future migration flows to Western EU countries. We
would be very grateful if you could answer the following questions. The
survey should not take more than 5 minutes to complete. We guarantee every
participant of the survey that the responses are kept confidential and are used
for scientific purposes only.
The European Union has now opened negotiations at the ministerial
levels with six countries seeking membership, namely the Czech Republic,
Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus. Others are in line, including
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. A major
problem with enlargement to the East is the expected labour market
consequences. 
In the short-run, the issue is dominated by the problem of economic
transition to a market economy in Eastern and Central Europe and by large
income and unemployment differentials to the West. It is unclear to what
extent these differences would cause out-migration in a more liberal setting.
Even today there are both substantial illegal immigration and legal temporary
labour immigration. Previous experience with intra Western European
migration suggests that labour mobility is rather slow in adjusting wage and
unemployment differentials. In the long-run, Western European societies are
ageing considerably, and, hence, may seek additional workers to support
their pension systems. 
In answering the following questions, assume that immediately after the
membership there will be free labour mobility. All questions refer to a period
of 10 years after the date of membership.
A) The potential size of migration flows
1.)  How would you assess the potential migration flows from your coun-
try to the Western EU-member countries in the 10 year following a
possible EU enlargement and under a regime of free labour mobility?98
Total number (in 100.000): 








2.)  Could you please rank your assessment of the three most important
receiving countries (in descending order, i.e. 1 = most important, 2 =
















B) The structure of the expected migration flow:
3.)  Do you think that most of the expected migration flows will be
permanent? 
Yes: No:
Please give us your opinion on the share of permanent migrants to the
expected  total migration flow as well:
permanent migrants as a % of total migration flow:99
4.)  Do you think that the migrants would be mostly labour migrants? 
Yes: No:
Please give us your opinion on the share of labour migrants the
expected total migration flow as well:
Permanent migrants as a % of total migration flow:
5.)  Do you think that most of the migrants will be skilled, i.e. will at
least have finished secondary schooling? 
Yes: No:
Please give us your opinion on the share of skilled migrants the
expected total migration flow as well:
Skilled migrants as a % of total migration flow:
6.)  What do you think are the most important reasons for people in
Central and Eastern European countries to migrate to the West.
Please rank the following reasons in descending order (1=most
important, 6=least important):
-  They could earn more money:
-  They have a higher probability of finding a job:
-  Lower accident rates at work:
-  A better social security system:
-  A more stable political situation:
-  Existing networks of former migrants:
C)  Please give us the following information, as well:.
- What is your nationality:
Thank you very much for your co-operation.100
Table A.1.: IZA survey on potential migration flows from the East to
the West
Observations
Potential Migration Flows  Total (in 100.000) 1.884  16
(1.507)
% of  population of sending  2.650 20
country (2.059)
Receiving Countries:
Most important receiving country Austria 5% 18
Germany 85%









Structure of Expected Migration Flow:
Expected migration flow "YES" 15% 20
is mostly permanent
Share of permanent migrants 37% 19 
(in % of total flow)
Mostly Labour migrants "YES" 70% 18
Share of labour migrants:  62% 17 
(% of total flow)
Mostly Skilled migrants "YES" 85% 20
Share of skilled migrants:  65% 19 
(% of total flow)
Reasons to migrate 
(Mean of the rank 1-6): •     Earn more money 1.050 20
(0.220)
•     Find a job 2.800 20
(1.150)
•     Social security system 3.000 19
(1.150)
•     Networks 4.420 19
(1.26)
•     Political stability 4.440 18
(1.250)
•     Workplace security 5.280 18
(0.890)









Estimation Results for the Simulation in Section 2.3.4.
As explained Section 2.3.4., we simulate the migration potential from East
European countries to the EU using the migration experience from Greece,
Spain, and Portugal to the EU member countries for the period from 1985 to
1997. The data used for the estimation is drawn from the statistical annex of
Europäische Kommission (various issues): Europäische Wirtschaft, and from
EUROSTAT (various issues): Wanderungsstatistik. The data set is available
on request. Since data is not available for all years and for all receiving
countries, a final panel data set of 323 observations is available for
estimation. 
Following the empirical literature on migration (see Section 2.2.2) we
estimated the following log-linear equation using a fixed effects estimator:
where s refers to the sending country (i.e. Greece, Spain, and Portugal), r to
the respective receiving country (i.e. the other EU countries), and t refers to
the year. Ds refer to dummy variables indicating the respective sending
countries (i.e. Greece, Spain, and Portugal). The equation has been estimated
for the entire time period from 1985 to 1997, the sub-period during which
mobility between the three sending countries and the other EU countries was
restricted (Greece: 1985-1987; Spain and Portugal: 1985-1991), and the sub-
period during which free mobility between the sending countries and the
other receiving countries was allowed (Greece: 1989-1997; Spain, Portugal:
1992-1997).
The following Table shows the estimations results:
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Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses. With the exception of the
coefficient on relative unemployment in the sub-period of free mobility, all
coefficients are statistically significant at least at a 1% level. c1 shows the
Likelihood-Ratio-Test statistic of a test of the model with fixed effects
against a model which includes the constant term only. c1 shows the
Likelihood-Ratio-Test statistic of a test of the model with fixed effects
against a model which includes only the fixed effects. c3 show the
Likelihood-Ratio-Test statistic of a test of the model with fixed effects
against a model which includes only two control variables (i.e. the relative
unemployment rate and relative real GDP). In most cases these tests favour
the estimated model at least at a 1% level. For the equation in the sub-period
of free mobility, c3 is only significant at a 10% level. 
Table A.2.: Estimation results
Time Period:
Variable                                       Total Restricted Mobility     Free Mobility
Relative Unemployment Rate  -1.263 -1.676 0.500
(b1) (4.55) (4.28) (1.26)
Relative Real GDP (ß2) -4.648 -3.864 -6.118
(7.22) (4.22) (6.70)
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.21
c1 60.66 30.00 44.14
c2 51.06 23.01 41.46
c3 10.67 7.87 4.96103
APPENDIX C
A theoretical model of the labour market effects of immigration
The model assumes an economy which produces a single output according to
a constant-returns-to-scale production function with capital, skilled labour S,
and unskilled labour L. The output price is considered to be pre-determined;
both types of labour are q-complements (the standard case). Natives supply
input factors at fixed levels. The level of immigration M is fixed by govern-
mental rules. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that immigrants
do not carry any capital with them and have no effect on the demand-side of
the economy. Two polar cases are considered: migrants are either perfect
substitutes to the unskilled workers or to the skilled workers.
Amonopoly union sets the wage w on the market for unskilled labour and
employers then choose the level of employment in this market. Competitive
forces determine the wage v for skilled workers. Nevertheless, the union
cares for them. Employed unskilled natives are N=aL, where a = N – /(N –+M – ),
and M = (1 - a)L. The objective function of the union is given by:
(A1)  maxw W = vS + wN
b, 0 < b < 1,  
where S – and N – are the fixed levels of skilled and unskilled natives, b is a
weight for the employment of unskilled workers.
Profit maximisation of the firm implies that real wages are equal to
marginal productivity. Suppressing the equation for capital, it follows:
(A2)  v = (S –,L)
(A3)  L = L(w,S –).
S is predetermined to the model, w is predetermined by the monopoly union,
and v is fixed by a competitive market. vs, Lw < 0 and vL, Ls > 0. Second
derivatives are assumed to be zero so that (A2) and (A3) are linear.
The union's problem is to maximise W with respect to w. Hence, the first-
order condition implies104
(A4)  ( ) 0.   L     )
w
L

















¶ b b - b b  
 
Considering the situation before immigration (a = 1), (A4) could be expressed as: 
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  At first we want to assume unskilled immigration, which affects (A5) 
by a variation of a. Comparative statics lead to: 
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One also obtains: 
 
Skilled immigration can be modelled by a variation of  . S  Hence: 
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  In  general,  equation  (A9)  may  take  any  sign. 
  Reasonable  sizes  of  the elasticities, however, imply: 
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so that  0   <   S  /  w ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ  in equation (A9). 
Straightforward derivations lead to: 
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The sign of (A11) follows directly from the optimality condition (A6). 106
 
To  calculate  the  gain  from  immigration  in  the  equilibrium  framework, 
we  closely  follow  the  work of Borjas (1995). We assume a  concave and 
linear homogeneous production function:
 
(B1)   Y = f (K, S, L) = f (K, rN + lM, (1-r)N + (1-l)M),  
 
where Y refers to the output, K to Capital, S to skilled workers, L to un-
skilled workers, and M to the immigrants.    r  and  l  give  the  fraction  of 
respectively.  If  the  wage 
productivity, the increase in national income through immigration accruing to the 
natives is:
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where  ys  and  yL  are  the  shares  of  national  incomes  accruing  to  skilled  and
is  the  fraction  of  immigrants  to  the  total  labour  force, 
tS  and  tL  are  the  shares  of  the  work force that are skilled and unskilled, 
 
If only skilled (l = 1) or unskilled (l = 0) immigration is considered,  
skilled  workers  among  natives  and  immigrants,
of  each  production  factor  is  determined  by  the  respective  marginal
restriction that
(B2)  in  percentage  terms  one  obtains  (see
unskilled  workers,  m
and
respectively. 
(B3) is reduced to:
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where  ys  and  yL  are  the  shares  of  national  incomes  accruing  to  skilled  and
is  the  fraction  of  immigrants  to  the  total  labour  force, 
tS  and  tL  are  the  shares  of  the  work force that are skilled and unskilled, 
 
If only skilled (l = 1) or unskilled (l = 0) immigration is considered,  
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unskilled  workers,  m
and
respectively. 
(B3) is reduced to:
higher the fraction of migrants to skilled or unskilled native workers 
(m2 /t
2
i, with i = S, L), respectively.  In the simple case of only       
labour, (B3) is reduced to:  one type of 
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which corresponds to triangle C in Figure 9. 
The wages qi with i = v, w after immigration can be calculated as: 
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Assuming that immigrants bring no capital with them and using  (
the income accruing to immigrants can be calculated as:  
B2),
respectively.  It is evident, that the immigration gain for both types of native 
labour is the higher, the higher their initial share of national income, the 
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where the first three terms show the income accruing to skilled immigrants 
and the second three  terms the income accruing to unskilled immigrants.
  The total effect of immigration on the production of the receiving country is: 
(B9) 
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Assuming that the income shares of the production factors are not changed 
by immigration, the immigration gain of skilled and unskilled natives can be 
calculated  by subtracting the corresponding income of immigrants from the 
total gain.  Due to the Euler-Theorem, the rest of the immigration gain is 
owned by capital.